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ABSTRACT
STRUCTURING THOUGHT:
CONCEPTS, COMPUTATIONAL SYNTAX,
AND COGNITIVE EXPLANATION
SEPTEMBER 2016
MATTHEW B. GIFFORD
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Louise Antony
The topic of this dissertation is what thought must be like in order for the laws
and generalizations of psychology to be true. I address a number of contemporary
problems in the philosophy of mind concerning the nature and structure of concepts
and the ontological status of mental content. Drawing on the empirical literature, I
develop a number of new conceptual tools for theorizing about concepts, including a
counterpart model of concepts’ role in linguistic communication, and a deflationary
theory of concepts’ formal features. I also suggest some new answers to old problems,
arguing, for example, that content realism is not hostage to a naturalized semantics.
This dissertation can, as a whole, be read as a sympathetic re-evaluation of the
language of thought hypothesis (LOT), a view most famously associated with the
philosopher Jerry Fodor, who has been its most ardent champion for decades. LOT
claims that thoughts are sentences in a mental language of computation, and are
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composed of meaningful, atomic symbols—concepts—which are individuated entirely
by their formal features. Each chapter either defends various components of LOT
from recent criticism, or fills in gaps in the theory.
I begin the dissertation by introducing the language of thought project, and
motivating and explaining each of its central components. I provide the necessary
background for understanding the controversies surrounding LOT by explaining the
computational/representational theory of mind. While these are now relatively un-
controversial, LOT’s commitments to concept atomism and content realism are the
subject of much debate. In chapter 2, I discuss a recent competitor to atomism—
neo-empiricism—and argue that it fails to meet several key desiderata on theories of
concepts, and defend atomism from similar charges. In chapter 3, I argue against a
view common to both philosophy and psychology: that concepts must be shareable.
If true, atomism is in jeopardy. I find shareability to be unmotivated, and suggest
an alternative counterpart model of concepts that does a better job of explaining the
things shareability was supposed to explain. Chapter 4 takes up the question of what
formal features are and how mental symbols are individuated. I develop a reduc-
tive account, arguing that formal features are certain sorts of physical properties and
symbol types are sets of these properties. I turn to the topic of content in chapter 5,
and defend a very strong version of content realism against recent criticism.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: THE STRUCTURED MIND
1.1 The armchair reader
Human thought is a very powerful tool. We can think about a great many things—
things we perceive, and things we do not; things that have happened, things that
will happen, and things that never come to be; things that exist, things that could
exist but do not, and things that cannot exist at all. We can reason with thought.
Thoughts can influence our behavior. And there seems to be no limit—apart from
the constraints of time—to the number of new and different thoughts we can think.
Perhaps our greatest resource for discovering what thought must be like to explain
all of these things is the empirical, scientific study of the mind—psychology. Since
modern cognitive psychology’s birth in the second half of the twentieth century, the
field has provided invaluable insight into the rules and laws that govern the mind’s
operations. This dissertation is not, however, an empirical work. I have conducted no
experiments, collected no data. But neither is it armchair psychology or philosophy;
it is informed and constrained by empirical findings. It is about is what thought must
be like in order for the laws and generalizations of psychology to be true.
This dissertation addresses its topic by providing a sympathetic re-evaluation of
the language of thought hypothesis (LOT). LOT makes the following claims. Thoughts—
mental states that express propositions—are sentences in a mental computational
language. They are constructed from concepts, representations that have intentional
content (they refer to things) and are individuated by their formal (non-semantic) fea-
tures. Concepts themselves are structureless atoms. They are compositional—they
1
can be combined together to form new complex representations, the meaning of which
is wholly determined by the meanings of its parts and their rules for combination.
The rules governing the mind’s operations are defined over only the formal features
of mental representations.
As anyone familiar with LOT knows, it is the brainchild of the philosopher Jerry
Fodor, who introduced it, developed it, and has been its most ardent champion for
decades. Fodor (1975) advanced a seminal defense of the idea that thoughts are com-
putational/representational structures. Fodor (1998) developed the idea of concept
atomism—that concepts are structureless mental objects. And Fodor in his (1987,
1992a, and 1995) argues that intentional content plays an important role in psychol-
ogy, and that content determination can be the product of a naturalistic relation
between the mind and the world. While Fodor was not the first or only person to
defend each of these views (except, perhaps, for atomism), he was the first to unify
them in a single theory.
Though widely discussed, LOT has gained only minor acceptance in both philos-
ophy and psychology. This is partly because it is misunderstood.1 But it also faces a
number of very serious, current challenges. Atomism in particular is under constant
fire. Psychologists seem to have landed on versions of prototype theories2, exemplar
theories3, theory-theories4, or neo-empiricist theories5 instead. Defenders of these
1See, for example, chapter 2, §2.4.
2Prototype theories hold that concepts are structures of statistically typical features of the cate-
gories they represent. c.f. Rosch (1978).
3Exemplar theories identify concepts with (collections of) examples of category members (e.g., a
dog concept is an image of a typical dog). c.f. Medin et al. (1982).
4Theory-theories claim that concepts are sets of representations linked together to form a mini-
theory of what they represent. So a water concept might contain representations of water being a
natural kind, water being wet, etc. c.f. Carey (2009).
5According to neo-empiricists, concepts are structures of sensory symbols. c.f. Barsalou (1999)
for a defense of this view, and chapter 2 of this thesis for a critical discussion.
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views argue that atomism fails to meet some or other desiderata on a theory of con-
cepts. Content realism is perennially called into question. Egan (2014) has recently
argued that it is not needed in cognitive science, though content ascription is a nec-
essary heuristic for explanation. Various authors have criticized “formal features” as
being an incoherent notion, and that individuating concepts by these features renders
LOT unable to explain certain facts about our mental lives. There is also very little
said about what formal features actually are, so most discussions of them remain
metaphorical, to the detriment of LOT.
My goal is to remind us of LOT’s attractions and address recent criticisms. Each
chapter addresses a different puzzle or challenge facing LOT. Together, they provide
a new defense of some old ideas, and introduce a number of new conceptual tools for
those trying to understand the nature of thought.
At the end of this chapter, I will provide an overview of each subsequent chapter’s
project. First, I figure I ought to say something about why LOT is worth taking
seriously. I will introduce and motivate each of its four main components: the rep-
resentational theory of mind, the computational theory of thought, content realism,
and concept atomism.
1.2 Representationalism
The representational theory of mind (or representationalism) holds that thoughts
and propositional attitudes are relations between people and mental representations.
To believe that p, according to representationalism, is to bear the belief relation to a
mental representation of p (mutatis mutandis for the other propositional attitudes).
There are a number of reasons that we should accept representationalism. One
is that it vindicates our ordinary folk psychology. We might, for example, say that
Mary went to the water fountain because she desired water and believed that going to
the fountain was the best way to get it. These belief/desire attributions have proven
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extremely useful for predicting and explaining behavior. This strongly suggests that
they are (often) true. If so, then there must be beliefs and desires, and they must
be about things. Representationalism goes some distance towards explaining what
this would mean: to believe that Mary wants water is to bear the belief relation to a
mental representation with the content Mary wants water.
Representationalism also provides a framework for understanding the causal rela-
tionship between a thinker and the objects of thought. My currently unseen, distant
cat plays a role in getting me to buy cat food on the way home. The (non-obtaining)
state of affairs of Mary drinking water plays some role in causing Mary to go to the
fountain. An imaginary barber’s absurd standards for cliente`le famously played a
role in getting Russell to write a letter to Frege. How do these things—from the
mundane, to the non-actual, to the impossible—influence our thought and action?
According to representationalism, they do not. At least, not directly. Instead there
are proxies for these things: mental particulars representing them. What enters into
the causal chain is a mental representation of my cat, of Mary drinking water, or of
an impossible barber.
Representationalism raises a number of questions. If it is true, we should want to
know what sorts of things mental representations are, how thinkers are related to the
representations, and how representations are related to their referents. The (classical)
computational theory of thought (or computationalism) is an attempt to answer the
first two of these questions.
1.3 Computationalism
Computationalism holds that thought is computation. Mental representations are
symbols, and thinking is a process of symbol manipulation. More specifically, it is
a process that responds to the symbols’ non-semantic features in such a way as to
respect their semantic relations.
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Unpacking this we can see that computationalism is committed to three main
claims: thought is a process of symbol manipulation; mental symbols have semantic
and non-semantic features; and thought responds only to the non-semantic features
of these symbols.
The idea behind the first claim is simple enough. Token representations can
causally interact with the world only if they are concrete entities. And a symbol
just is a concrete entity with a semantic interpretation. If we accept that represen-
tational states are causally efficacious, then we ought to accept that representations
are symbols. So, if the process of thought consists in manipulating representations,
then thought consists in manipulating symbols.
Thoughts themselves are symbolic structures. They are like sentences in a compu-
tational language. They are composed of primitive computational symbols, analogous
to words, which have their own semantic and non-semantic features, and contribute
these features to the more complex representations. Primitive symbols are combined
according to rules of combination, defined over their non-semantic features. So, for
example, the thought that Doug is dreaming might be a complex representation—
〈Doug is dreaming〉—with primitive symbols 〈Doug〉 (meaning Doug) and 〈dreaming〉
(meaning dreaming) as its constituent parts, combined together according to the
mind’s rules so that one is predicated of the other.
Symbolic structure is a key point of contrast between computationalism (or clas-
sical computationalism) and non-classically computational models, like connectionist
networks. Non-classical models treat thoughts as sui generis computational kinds.6
Computationalists might hold, for example, that a belief that chocolate is tasty is a
structured symbol like this: 〈chocolate is tasty〉. This, they claim, has meaningful
constituent parts: 〈chocolate〉 and 〈tasty〉. By contrast, a non-classicist might hold
6See Smolensky (1988) for a description of a connectionist computational model that works along
these lines.
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that the belief is itself a symbol, but has no independently meaningful parts. Consider
as an analogy the English word ‘chocolate’. The word has parts—‘hoco’, e.g.—but
these parts are not constituents—they are not independently meaningful symbols in
English which contribute their meaning to the meaning of ‘chocolate’. On at least
some non-classical views, attitude states are like this too.7
This fact about connectionist models has led Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988), Fodor
and McLaughlin (1990), and McLaughlin (1993) to object to them on the grounds
that human thought exhibits certain systematic regularities that are only predicted
and explained by classical computational structures. To borrow an example from
McLaughlin (1993), a human with the capacity to believe that the dog is chasing the
cat ipso facto has the capacity to believe that the cat is chasing the dog. The classical
model predicts this. Since both of the relevant beliefs use exactly the same symbols
and rules of composition, a classically computational system with the resources to
entertain one of these beliefs has all the resources required to entertain the other.8
By contrast, it is possible for connectionist systems to entertain one but not the
other. Since (roughly) the beliefs are taken as unstructured objects, these beliefs
need not have any meaningful parts in common, nor are they composed by a system
of rules defined over such elements. So, nothing about the capacity of such a system
to entertain one implies the capacity to entertain the other. More recent connectionist
models, like that of Frank et al. (2009), explicitly attempt to overcome this problem.
While these models do respect systematic regularities in certain limited circumstances,
unlike classical computationalist models they do not predict systematic regularities,
but rather must be designed to accommodate them.
7In particular, Smolensky’s work in the 1980s and 90s (op. cit.). But, as Hadley (2004) argues,
the following criticism applies to more recent work as well (e.g., Bode´n and Niklasson (2000)).
8Though see Hadley (1997) for criticism of the claim that classical systems can, by their nature,
capture this type of systematicity. See Aizawa (2003, ch. 5) for a response to Hadley’s arguments
and (qualified) defense of classicism.
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Computationalism’s second claim is that mental symbols have both semantic and
non-semantic features. As representations, mental symbols must have a semantics.
There is debate about just what it means for symbols to “have” a semantics. In
chapter 5, I argue for a strong realism about the content of mental representations.
For now, it will suffice to say that part of what distinguishes symbols from everything
else in the world is that they are representational.
Mental symbols must also have non-semantic (/formal) features. Clearly, as con-
crete entities, symbols have all sorts of non-semantic properties (their location and
size, e.g.). The interesting claim is that lexical types of mental symbols are individu-
ated by their non-semantic properties. The mind needs to know what sorts of symbols
it has—when two symbols are the same lexical type, and when they are distinct. And
it can’t do this by looking at their semantic properties. So, mental bookkeeping works
by keeping track of the formal features of mental symbols. Whether two symbols are
the same lexical type depends on whether they share all of their formal features.
Non-semantic symbol individuation leads to computationalism’s key insight: that
physical systems can respect semantic relations by responding to non-semantic prop-
erties.
Our thoughts exhibit semantic regularities. Seeing snow outside causes me to
believe that it’s snowing and therefore cold, which causes me to desire that I get my
jacket before going outside. The relationships between a belief that it’s snowing, a
belief that it’s cold, and a desire for a coat are semantically intelligible. They reflect
relations between snow, cold, and jackets.
But meaning that it’s snowing is not a causally efficacious property. So how do
the causal relations between thoughts, qua physically realized mental objects, manage
to obey semantic relations between what they represent? According to computation-
alism, thought exploits the non-semantic features of symbolic structures to capture
semantic relations. While a physical system might not be able to respond to the
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meaning of ‘snow’, it could respond to the fact that ‘snow’ is so written. A system
could be entirely blind to semantic features, but have a rule that says “if you see the
shape ‘it’s snowing’ written here, write the shape ‘it’s cold’ there.”
Thought, on the computationalist view, works via the same process. Mental pro-
cessors obey rules for manipulating symbols that are defined over their non-semantic
features, but respect the semantic relations of their representational content. That
the mental symbol 〈snow〉 means snow is not available to the mind. The fact that it
“looks like” ‘〈snow〉’, however, is. The semantic relations between snow and cold are
born out in symbolic relations between 〈snow〉 and 〈cold〉.
To recap: Thoughts are sentences in a mental language of computation (mentalese
or the language of thought). They are made up of word-like symbols, which have
content and contribute this to the meaning of the sentences they compose. The rules
that govern how they can combine to form new complex representations are defined
over their formal features. Thinking, on this view, is a process of manipulating
symbol structures. To infer that it is cold outside on the basis of the beliefs that
it is snowing, and if it is snowing, then it is cold outside, is to follow a rule that
says you can construct a complex symbol that looks like 〈cold outside〉 if you bear
the belief relation to symbols that look like 〈snowing〉 and 〈if snowing, then cold
outside〉. These rules are formal, and make no mention of content. One such rule
might say, for example, “infer Q from P and if P, then Q” where ‘P ’ and ‘Q ’ range
over categories of symbols, and stand for formally individuated expressions.
1.4 The structure of concepts
Concepts are the symbols that compose thoughts. They are the computational
symbols described above, the analogs to words in mentalese.
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Explanatory role of concepts
Concepts are thought to play a number of explanatory roles within cognitive
science.9 There are three demands on concepts that will be at issue in later chapters.
Compositionality: Fodor and his followers have been instrumental in draw-
ing attention to concepts’ role in explaining the productivity and systematicity of
thought.10 ‘Productivity’ refers to our capacity, in principle, to entertain and under-
stand an unbounded number of novel thoughts. If we can think of a show and think
of a pre-show then we can think of a pre-pre-show, a pre-pre-pre-show, and so on. We
manage to do this despite having finite representational capacities; we cannot store an
infinite number of unique representations in our heads. Likewise, we can understand
new thoughts. Despite never before having read the sentence “the UMass library is
closing due to its books becoming sentient and walking out,” you understand it. The
systematicity of thought I described briefly above: the fact that our ability to under-
stand and entertain certain thoughts entails the ability to understand and entertain
certain other thoughts.
To explain productivity and systematicity, concepts are thought to be composi-
tional. They can combine together to form new complex concepts, and what these
new concepts mean is determined entirely by the meanings of their constituent con-
cepts and the rules of combination. That means that as long as you understand all
of the constituent concepts in a thought, you will be able to understand the thought.
And, if the rules of composition are recursive, you can generate an infinite number of
well formed expressions in mentalese from a finite base.
Publicity: Almost all theorists believe that concepts can be and are shared
between different people. Shared concepts are thought be required in order to enable
9Different formulations of these same explanatory demands on a theory of concepts can be found
in Carey (2009, pp. 489–91), Fodor (1998, ch. 2), Prinz (2002, pp. 3–16), and Rey (1983, p. 241).
10c.f. Fodor (1975, 1998); Laurence and Margolis (1999); Rey (1995).
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successful linguistic communication—we can communicate about moose by using the
word ‘moose’ because you and I share a concept 〈moose〉 and map it onto ‘moose’.
We also seem to need shared concepts to capture psychological generalizations.
Take for example recent work by Huang and Bargh (2014), who argue that behavior is
best explained by modeling action-guiding cognition as a structure of competing goals
(mental representations of desired end-states). Their model predicts that individuals’
goals “constrain the individual’s information processing and behavioral possibilities
in a way that encourages achievement of the goal’s end-state” (127). As evidence that
this does in fact occur, they point to studies showing that when competing groups are
given a shared goal, the group’s perceptions of the other group are transformed (130).
To make such explanations work, it seems that participants in these studies need to
share goals—that is, to share representations of end-states. This in turn would seem
to require shared concepts.
Because of considerations like these, many theorists endorse what is called the
publicity or shareability constraint on a theory of concepts: whatever concepts are,
they must be able to be shared by different people.11
Frege cases: Oedipus very much wanted not to marry Mom. Yet, forced by
no one, he did. His misfortune was caused by the fact that he was in a Frege case.
Frege cases, roughly, are situations in which someone fails to realize that two terms
co-refer. They are named for the logician and philosopher of language Gottlob Frege,
who raised the question of why substitutivity—the principle that co-referring terms
can be substituted for one another salva veritate—seems to fail in belief reports (Frege
(1892)). For example, it seems true to say that “Oedipus wants to marry Jocasta,”
but not “Oedipus wants to marry Mom” despite ‘Jocasta’ and ‘Mom’ referring to the
11c.f. Fodor (1998, pp. 28–34); Fodor and Lepore (1992); Laurence and Margolis (1999) (in
terms of stability); Prinz (2002, pp. 14–16); Rey (1983, p. 282) (in terms of “interpersonal stability
functions”).
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same person. Frege cases are rather common. One might want to buy chickpeas, but
fail to do so because they are labeled ‘garbanzo beans’, for example.
The going thought is that such cases arise because people can have multiple con-
cepts for the same thing, and no way of telling a priori that they co-refer. Oedipus
is led to his doom because he has a 〈Mom〉 concept and a 〈Jocasta〉 concept, but
nothing he knows clues him into the fact that their referents are one and the same.
The implication, then, for a theory of concepts, is that it must make such situ-
ations possible. Concepts need to be individuated more finely than reference alone
allows. Just how this is done is a matter of controversy. Co-referring concepts might,
some think, still be semantically distinct—there is more to meaning, perhaps, than
reference. Other argue that concepts should be individuated by their causal role.
If so, co-referring concepts would be distinguished by their taking part in different
inferences, beliefs, etc. Still others hold that co-referring concepts are distinguished
by their non-semantic features, analogous to the way ‘camel’ and ‘dromedary’ are
distinguished in written language.
Atomism, LOT’s theory of concepts, takes this last road.
Atomism
Atomism is a theory about the structure of concepts—namely, that they do not
have any. This view, first developed by Fodor (1998), says that lexical concepts
(concepts that, roughly, correspond to words in a natural language) are structureless
atoms that carry informational content. They are definitionally and developmentally
primitive. They are not made up of other concepts, features, or other semantically
evaluable parts. They do not depend on any other concepts for their content.
One of the main appeals of this view is that it is amenable to a causal-informational
semantics. Most competing theories hold that concepts’ content is somehow deter-
mined by their structure. The prototype theory, for example, roughly holds that con-
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cepts are a list of the features typically had by members of the category the concept
represents. So 〈chicken〉 might be made up of features like 〈has feathers〉, and 〈has
a beak〉. The problem is that this does not capture the way our semantic judgments
work: plucked chickens are still chickens. Further, as Keil (1989) argues, prototype
theories fail to predict or explain data concerning category membership under change.
We judge, for example, a creature who starts life as a cat but is altered to look and act
like a skunk—satisfying all the prototypical features of skunks, and not of cats—to
nonetheless be a cat and not a skunk.
Atomism avoids these problems by holding that all there is to being a concept
with the content chicken is to be causally related to the property of being chicken in
the right sort of way.12
Atomism is also attractive because it lends itself readily to being compositional—
which is necessary for explaining the productivity and systematicity of thought. Since
concepts are primitive expressions, and rely on external relations for their content, it
is relatively simple to see how atoms can combine to form new, complex, meaningful,
intelligible representations. It’s roughly the same way that words form sentences or,
more aptly, how primitive expressions can be combined to form complex expressions
in a formal language of logic.
By contrast with atomism, prototype theories struggle to be compositional. As
Fodor (1998) argues, a prototypical pet (e.g. a furry mammal) and the prototypical
fish (e.g. something that lives in the ocean) do not combine to generate the features
of the prototypical pet fish (e.g. a goldfish).
12Note that not all of atomism’s competitors face this sort of problem. Notably Carey (2009)
argues for a theory-theory according to which concepts have a dual-factor semantics, which imbue
concepts with two dimensions of meaning. One is an informational semantics, the other is determined
by the structure of the concept. This latter factor is supposed to explain things like category
judgments and so-called “cognitive content.” The problem for this theory is that neither of these
are things that concepts need to explain. While concepts must be able to refer to categories, they
mechanisms that allow us to recognize category instances may be external to the concepts for these
categories. And, as I will argue in the next chapter, “cognitive content” does not exist.
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1.5 Content realism
If the non-semantic features of mental symbols do all of the causal work, as com-
putationalism claims, is there a place for mental content in a scientific theory of the
mind? Some cognitive scientists, notably Stich (1983) and Chomsky (1995), argue
there is not. Talk of mental content, they argue, can be eliminated from our explana-
tory vocabulary. I will not address criticisms of realism in this section. In chapter
5 I argue for a strong realism about mental content—that mental representations
not only have content, but that their content constitutes part of their type identity
within cognitive science. Here I present a prima facie motivation for the position:
that actual explanations in the cognitive sciences appeal to mental content, and that
such appeals are useful.
One example from the developmental literature is Leslie and Keeble’s (1987) land-
mark study using looking time experiments to investigate how infants perceive causal
events. They habituated six-month-old infants to two scenarios: one in which a
moving object, A, contacted a stationary object, B, which then moved; the other
in which A moved, and then B moved, but there was no contact. The researchers
then presented the infants with the scenarios played in reverse (B contacts A, which
then moves; B moves first and does not contact A, then A moves). They found that
the infants looked longer at the reversal of the first scenario than the reversal of the
second, indicating that they perceived the former as more novel.
Why would there be a difference in perceived novelty given that just as much has
changed visually in both? Leslie and Keeble (1987) argued that we can explain this if
the infants took only the first event to show causation. Taken as a causal event, the
contact reversal included not only a reversal of event order—which the other scenario
also had—but an additional role reversal, with A changing from causal agent to causal
patient (and vice versa for B). Because the infants took there to be more differences
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between original and reversed contact events than the reversed non-contact events,
the former were more novel for them than the latter.
For this explanation to be true, infants must represent the action in the scenario
as causation and the objects in the scenario as causal agents and causal patients.
Further, the content of these representations was crucial to Leslie and Keeble’s (1987)
prediction. They were able to reason that these additional changes would occur in
infants’ representations of these events because (pace Hume) these additional changes
exist in the reversal of causal events. That is, they reasoned from a relation that holds
between the represented to a relation that holds between the representations.
The developmental literature teems with this sort of explanation. As a another
example, take Ganea et al. (2009) who (building on the work of Preissler and Bloom
(2007)) show that children learning a new word by associating it with a picture of an
object will extend the word to the object itself, even when the object is perceptually
distinct from its depiction (e.g., it is a different color). This suggests that young
children (15 months) understand pictures symbolically—as depictions of a thing. This
ability to distinguish between picture and object, and to understand the picture is of
an object, seems to require that infants have concepts referring to things they have
never directly encountered, and represent pictures as being of those things.
We can find a different sort of appeal to content in the cognitive neuroscience
literature. In one example, Fischer et al. (2011) used an fMRI to study activation
patterns in higher-level visual areas of the brain in situations where subjects made
errors in reporting an object’s location. The researchers identified which patterns of
brain activation corresponded with correct reports (e.g., the object was in location
1, and that’s where the subject indicated it was). They then presented subjects
with rapid changes in object location, which generated errors in reported location
(e.g., the object was in location 2, but the subject indicated it was in location 1).
What they found was that when subjects incorrectly reported an object as being
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in a particular location, the activation patterns of the visual areas were the same
as when the subject correctly reported an object as being in that location. So, if
the object was in location 2 but the subject indicated that it was in location 1,
the subject’s visual system would display the activity that corresponded to correct
location 1 reports. (They conducted similar tests with similar results comparing the
retinal location versus reported location of the object.)
Explaining their findings, Fischer et al. (2011) conclude that “changes in the
patterns of activity in each of these higher level areas were more tightly coupled with
changes in perceived position than in physical position” (p. 120, emphasis added). By
saying that these areas are correlated with a perceived position, they are suggesting
a correspondence with mental content. The subject represents the object and various
locations, and represents the object as being in those locations. If we wanted to
predict the activation patterns in these areas, we could not look at the data about
where the object was (or its relative retinal location). What we would want to
know is where the subject thought it was. That is, we need to talk about where the
subject represents the object as being—an intentional characterization—to specify
the unifying correlate for the observed brain activity.
As a final example, consider a classic case in the psychology of judgment. Using
a number of clever experiments, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) show that we are
loss averse—that the (negative) value we put on losing something is greater than the
(positive) value we put on gaining that same thing. So, for example, the price with
which I would be willing to part with a coffee mug is higher than the price I would
be willing to pay to acquire the coffee mug. Loss aversion interacts with a number
of other biases, including what are known as framing effects. In a different study,
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) gave subjects a story about a disease that would kill
600 people, and presented them one of two sets of choices. In one set, subjects were
asked to choose between a course of action that would save 200 lives, and a course of
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action that would have a one-third probability of saving 600 people and a two-thirds
probability of saving no one. The other set of choices were between a course of action
in which 400 people would die, or one in which there was a one-thirds probability that
nobody would die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people would die. Though
the dilemma is the same in both cases in terms of objective results, 72% of people
presented with the first set chose the first option (saving 200) while 78% of people
presented with the second scenario chose the other outcome (one-third chance that
no one will die). What this shows is that we are sensitive to how a scenario is framed.
In particular, if something is framed as a loss, we will treat it differently than if the
very same thing is framed as a gain.
The point I want to make is that loss aversion can only explain the difference in
behavior in the framing scenario if we assume that we represent scenarios as losses
and gains. There is not an objective (external) difference in the scenarios. There is
only a difference in how we think about them. And to explain the difference in how
we think about them, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) subsume us by the content of
our mental states.
In all of the above examples, theorists make use of mental content as a theoretical
posit. Content is a part of our scientific parlance, not just our unscientific (though
useful and predictive) folk psychology. This gives us at least prima facie reason to
take this talk seriously, to be realists about content. The onus is on anti-realists to
show that we can and should engage in the revisionary project of doing away with
content in cognitive science.
1.6 The rest of the project
LOT is, at the very least, a promising research program. Whether or not it
actually works is what I will be exploring in the rest of this dissertation. I want to
now briefly say how I will proceed.
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Neo-empiricism and reference
Chapter 2 takes up a recent challenge to concept atomism, neo-empiricism. Neo-
empiricism is the view that concepts are structures of percepts—mental representa-
tions in the proprietary vocabulary of our sensory systems. I argue that neo-empiricist
theories face a number of problems regarding their approach to reference. Most of
the theories do not explain how semantic content is determined, and of those that
do, most rely on a na¨ıve “resemblance theory.” There is one, however, that clearly
states a philosophically sophisticated theory of how concepts get their content. Prinz
(2002, 2005) advances a neo-empiricist view, proxytype theory, which makes use of a
causal-informational theory of content very similar to the one atomism uses. He also
levels several direct charges against atomism.
Thorough though it is, I argue that Prinz’s view has some glaring holes. The
details of the theory do not work well with an information semantics, leading it to
make incoherent or errant content attributions. Its referential problems also prevent
concepts of the same lexical types to be recognized as such, and allow for indiscernible
concepts of different semantic and lexical types. Proxytype theory also fails to be
systematic because its theory of composition does not allow decomposition—complex
concepts cannot be broken into constituent parts, meaning that someone can think
of, e.g., a pet fish without being able to think of fish or pets. All of these problems
are surmountable, I argue. The problem for Prinz is that the changes he needs to
adopt to do so render his theory functionally indistinguishable from atomism.
I also confront Prinz’s (2002) criticisms of atomism: that it cannot explain cogni-
tive content, and that “formal features” cannot do all of the work atomists say that
they do. Atomism can, I argue, explain all of the things that cognitive content is
supposed to explain. It just does so without complicating concepts’ semantics. And,
indeed, it does so using resources that every theory of concepts has available. The
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upshot is that “cognitive content” is not something a theory of concepts needs to
explain.
Against the shareability of concepts
In chapter 3, I challenge an assumption common to both philosophy and psy-
chology: that concepts, whatever they are, must be shareable. This “shareability”
or “publicity” constraint is a problem for atomists. There are very good reasons
for thinking that atomic concepts, individuated by their formal features, cannot be
shared. Instead of reconciling atomism with the shareability constraint, I argue the
constraint should be abandoned. I consider the two broad reasons theorists offer in
support of this claim: that shared concepts are needed to explain linguistic communi-
cation, and that shared concepts are required for capturing psychological generaliza-
tions. I find that neither actually needs shared concepts. At most they require shared
content, which is not the same. Indeed, if shared concepts work the way theorists say
they do in explaining communication, we are actually led to a logical contradiction.
Ridding us of shareability does leave a hole in the theory. We still need to say
something about concepts’ role in communication. I advance a counterpart model of
concepts, which sets out conditions for distinct concepts to be counterparts to one
another using resources implicit in all theories of concepts.
Mental bookkeeping in the language of thought
The previous two chapters make much of the explanatory ability of concepts’
formal features. In chapter 4, I offer a theory of what formal features are, and how
lexical types are individuated in the language of thought. I argue for a reductive
view: that formal features are processor-detectable physical properties, and lexical
types are sets of such properties. My argument is that the primary job of formal
features is to allow the mind to recognize when token symbols are the same lexical
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type and when they are not, and physical properties are the only thing that can do
the job.
I consider a number of objections to the view, and the only worked-out competi-
tor on the market: Schneider’s (2011) theory that formal features are computational
roles. I argue that the computational role view has a number of serious problems.
Mental processors cannot detect roles, rendering them unable to distinguish and rec-
ognize lexical types. The theory is also ungrounded—without some prior criteria for
symbol individuation, there is nothing that determines which computational roles
exist and so, for Schneider, which symbol types exist. Finally, the theory results in
false equivocations, saying that symbols of different lexical types are the same.
Content realism and hyper-representationalism
Chapter 5 shifts focus to the semantics of mental symbols. LOT claims that mental
representations really do have content—that both their having content, and what that
content is are matters of objective fact. Recent work in philosophy suggests that this
may not be the case. Egan (2014) takes a look at a number of cognitive explanations
in vision science, and argues that while content attribution is an important part of
these theories, content possession is not. Content, she says, plays only a heuristic role
in cognitive science, allowing theorists to show how the mathematically characterized
mechanisms they propose amount to the intentionally characterized capacity they
initially set out to explain. She accuses realists of holding out hope for an unlikely
future: one in which a naturalistic theory of semantics is discovered.
I respond to Egan’s negative attack on realism by arguing that content realism is
not hostage to a naturalized semantics. Realism only requires that content attribu-
tions are based on objective, theory independent facts. I point to several examples
where this is exactly what happens. Against Egan’s positive proposal about the role
of content, I argue that she has considered a far too limited set of cases. Look-
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ing at examples of cognitive explanation from outside of vision science, I show that
theorists use content for far more than matching a mathematical mechanism to a
pre-theoretically characterized capacity. Not only do theorists attribute content to
capture true generalizations, but they use it to successfully make predictions when
no capacity is posited, something Egan’s view cannot explain.
Wrap up
We have, I think, some very good reasons to take the language of thought hypoth-
esis seriously. It provides a clear account of how thoughts are structured, and what
properties they have. As I have said, I intend to show that it can overcome its most
pressing contemporary problems. And note that my plan is to do so without adding
any extra explanatory posits to the theory. Instead, every chapter shows a better
way of working with the resources LOT already has. Preliminaries done, I will now
try to make good on my promises.
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CHAPTER 2
NEO-EMPIRICISM’S TROUBLES WITH CONTENT
Empiricism is resurgent in philosophy and psychology. This time around, it
presents as a theory about the vehicles of thought—of what concepts are and how
they are structured. I argue here that empiricist theories yield incoherent accounts
of reference, and are not compositional—two key goals for any theory of concepts.
Further, the revisions that empiricists would need to adopt in order to overcome these
problems would render them virtually indistinguishable from amodal theories.
Like the semantic form of empiricism which Quine (1951) laid to rest, or empirical
theories about the origin of our mental capacities which Chomsky helped to bury, the
current reanimation of empiricism attempts to explain cognitive features in terms
of perceptual elements. Concept empiricism, or neo-empiricism as it is sometimes
called, claims that thoughts are composed of (copies of) perceptual representations.
To think that the cat is on the mat, for example, is to bring online the copies of the
representations that occur in our perceptual system when we see/hear/feel cats and
mats.
Defenders of this view have offered both psychological evidence1 and philosophical
argument2 in its support. The empirical evidence for concept empiricism has faced
withering methodological critique.3 For example, Machery (2007) argues that while
neo-empiricists support their view by marshaling experiments demonstrating the use
1c.f. Barsalou (1999)
2c.f. Prinz (2002, 2005)
3c.f. Machery (2006 and 2007)
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of perceptual imagery, amodal theorists (those who hold that concepts are elements of
distinct, language-like systems of representation) have long held that we use mental
imagery for certain cognitive tasks—those where using imagery is the best way to
get results. Nonetheless, they claim, not all tasks that require concepts make use of
mental imagery, so concepts need not be sensory structures. The empiricists’ exper-
iments, Machery claims, are those where using mental imagery is the best strategy
for solving the cognitive problem at hand. So, they have failed to show a predictive
difference between theirs and amodal theories (pp. 32–34).
While arguments like Machery’s undermine the evidential support for neo-empiricism,
my aim in this chapter is to offer reasons for thinking neo-empiricism is false. I will
focus on Prinz’s (2002, 2005) proxytype theory. It is a particularly clear, and philo-
sophically informed, version of neo-empiricism, and one that is supposed to deal with
just the sort of puzzles I raise here.
2.1 Areas of contention
This chapter has a secondary purpose. It aims to defend atomism against Prinz’s
(2002) direct attacks. In the previous chapter, I set out concepts’ explanatory role,
and the basic tenets of atomism. The dispute between empiricism and atomism, as it
concerns us here, rests on the theories’ abilities to satisfy four particular desiderata on
theories of concepts. Prinz contends that, among other things, a theory of concepts
ought to explain how our thoughts get their intentional content, what cognitive content
is, and how concepts can be public or shareable. It must also be compatible with a
theory of compositionalality (Prinz, 2002, pp. 3–16).
Prinz charges that atomism fails both to explain publicity, and to give a plausible
account of cognitive content. As stated above, I argue that neo-empiricist theories
fail to explain intentional content and composition. Some of these requirements I
22
discussed in the previous chapter. I will briefly review them here, and explain the
additional work Prinz demands of concepts.
Intentional Content
Content is crucial to psychological explanation. For example, to understand Kah-
neman and Tversky’s (1979) theory of loss aversion, it must be true that people have
representations with the contents losses and gains. A theory of concepts must offer
a plausible account of how our concepts manage to refer to properties, events, and
other things.
Cognitive Content
There are two reasons for thinking that concepts cannot be individuated solely
by their referents. One is the existence of Frege cases. Frege cases are those where
substitutivity fails—where two co-referring terms cannot be substituted for one an-
other salva veritate. For example, someone ignorant of the fact that ‘J.K. Rowling’
and ‘Robert Galbraith’ refer to the same person may want to buy everything the
author J.K. Rowling has written, yet not buy any books where ‘Robert Galbraith’
is stated as the author, despite having the opportunity to do so. In such a case, it
seems perfectly fine to say “this person wants to buy all of J.K. Rowling’s books,”
yet somehow inapt to say “this person wants to buy all of Robert Galbraith’s books,”
even though (a na¨ıve) substitutivity principle says if one of these sentences is true,
the other is too.
One explanation of why these cases occur is that people can have two different
concepts of the same thing. The person in this example will have two concepts
referring to J.K. Rowling : 〈Rowling〉, which they associate with ‘J.K. Rowling’, and
〈Galbraith〉, which they associate with ‘Robert Galbraith’.
Prinz claims that what makes the 〈Rowling〉 and 〈Galbraith〉 concepts distinct
is that they have some sort of non-referential content that distinguishes them. This
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would be something like Frege’s theory of senses, where senses were some sort of
public object mediating the relation between a symbol and its referent, but also part
of the symbol’s content. Prinz holds that even if Frege’s view is not quite right,
we still need a semantic distinction between co-referring terms. Whatever this non-
referential content is—be it sense, or something else—is what Prinz (2002) refers to
as ‘cognitive content’ (p. 7–8).
Cognitive content is also evoked to explain the similar behavioral dispositions
of people who have referentially distinct concepts. A very striking case of this was
introduced in Putnam’s (1975) famous Twin Earth thought experiment. Twin Earth
is exactly like Earth, but instead of H2O, a substance with the chemical compound
XYZ fills its oceans, flows through faucets, etc. The inhabitants of Twin Earth,
counterparts to all the people who live on Earth, call XYZ “water.” They behave
exactly as we do, but wherever we have H2O, they have XYZ. As a result, my Twin
Earth counterpart has a concept, 〈watertwin〉, which refers to XYZ, and which he
associates with ‘water’. This concept plays a role in his psychology that is exactly
analogous to the role my 〈water〉 concept plays in mine. His XYZ beliefs, desires, etc.
will cause him to act the same way my water beliefs cause me to act. Despite the fact
that 〈watertwin〉 and 〈water〉 do not co-refer, it seems as if they have something in
common. Prinz (2002) says that they have some semantic feature, cognitive content,
in common.
So, Prinz claims, one job for a theory of concepts is to explain what distinguishes
co-referring concepts, and unites referentially distinct concepts. That is, they must
offer an account of cognitive content.
Publicity
The going wisdom claims that whatever concepts are, they must be shareable. It
must be possible for distinct people to have concepts of exactly the same type. Fodor
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and Lepore (1992) develop this point at length, arguing that linguistic communication
is impossible if people do not map their words onto the same concepts. If what
I mean by ‘bird’ is different from what you mean by ‘bird’, then I will be unable
to communicate to you what I mean when I say ‘that bird is a sparrow’. Fodor
(1998) again endorses this, expanding the justification to include giving psychological
generalizations. For a generalization like “thirsty people see water” to be true, he
argues, it must be the case that the word ‘water’ maps on the same concepts for you
and me; otherwise, the generalization means something different for both of us, and
my saying it makes it true only of me (1998, p. 29). Prinz (2002) makes the case by
a slightly different route, arguing that because people can act for the same reasons,
and reasons (beliefs, desires, etc.) are composed of concepts, then people must be
able to have the same concepts as one another. So, they agree, a theory of concepts
must explain what concepts are such that we can share them. (I disagree, and argue
against the publicity requirement (or shareability requirement) in chapter 3. But for
now, let’s grant this.)
Compositionality
We can think a potentially unbounded number of distinct thoughts. This is be-
cause our system of representation is productive—it allows an infinite number of
semantically and syntactically distinct mental structures. Fodor and Lepore (2002)
offer a charming example: Our thoughts allow us to think of a missile shield, an
anti-missile shield, an anti-anti-missile shield, an anti-anti-anti-missile shield, and so
on. (Though constraints on time and memory will stop this at some point, the rules
of the system allow it.)
Our thoughts are also systematic. The ability to entertain certain thoughts entails
the ability to think a variety of related thoughts. Someone who can believe that Jerry
bit into the turkey can also believe that the turkey bit into Jerry.
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To explain both of these features of thought, the dominant view is that thought
is compositional. Our system of thought follows recursive rules that allow a finite
store of concepts to be combined into an infinity of distinct complex structures. We
can understand these thoughts because their meaning is determined entirely by the
meanings of their constitutive concepts and the rules governing how they can be put
together. Systematicity falls out of this because the systematically related thoughts
employ the same primitive elements, and the same rules for composition. Productivity
results from meanings being determined in part by recursive rules.
Prinz and Fodor both hold that a theory of concepts must be compatible with
concepts’ being compositional.
2.2 Prinz’s “proxytype” theory
Neo-empiricism holds that concepts are percepts—sensory symbols. On Prinz’s
(2002, 2005) proxytype theory, this means that concepts are structures of copies of
the representations used in an organism’s dedicated input systems (2002, p. 115). He
construes these systems to include externally directed senses (e.g., vision), internally
directed senses (e.g., proprioception), emotions, and motor systems. So “sensory”
should be understood rather broadly.
When I see (smell, hear, etc.) a turkey, on Prinz’s view, I copy these perceptual
representations—in the proprietary vocabulary of each sensory system—into long-
term memory. Over time, these perceptual representations get linked together in a
network based on patterns of observed co-instantiation. So, seeing a turkey and hear-
ing a gobble links the auditory gobbling percept with the visual percept of turkeys.
These linked representations form what Prinz calls a long-term memory network.
Further instances of turkey percepts are stored in the turkey network on the basis of
their similarity with the things already stored, or co-instantiation with things that
are similar to stored representations (2002, pp. 144–149).
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These networks, Prinz says, refer to particular properties or objects, and act as
detectors for their referents: when enough of the features contained in the network
are detected, the network is triggered. Over time, we adjust the weights of various
elements in the system to better detect these objects or properties. If, for example,
we find that the best indicator of whether something is a turkey is that it has a
distinctive sort of wattle, then the visual representation of the wattle becomes more
heavily weighted.
Thinking requires the ability to hold conceptual structures in working memory,
which has a relatively limited storage capacity. These long-term memory networks
would be too unwieldy to bring into working memory. I could not think, e.g., that
Jerry bit the turkey, because working memory lacks the capacity to hold all of my
perceptual information about turkeys, much less all of my perceptual representations
of Jerry or biting. Prinz’s solution is to identify concepts not with networks, but
with proxytypes. Proxytypes are subsets of elements in long-term memory networks
that can be called into working memory to stand for whatever the network detects
(2002, p. 149). Tokening a proxytype, he says, “is generally tantamount to entering
a perceptual state of the kind one would be in if one were to experience the thing
it represents” (2002, p. 150). Which element serves as a proxytype depends on
context. If I am thinking that I would like a turkey sandwich, I might pull up an
image of a cooked turkey or the smell of a roasting turkey. If I think that turkeys
have interesting feathers, I may deploy an image of a turkey fanning its tail. If there
is no relevant context (e.g., someone just says “think of a turkey!”), Prinz says that
we use a default proxytype, which is sort of like a prototype in that it represents
some common features of whatever the network represents (2002, pp. 155–156). So,
there are many different proxytypes, and thus many different concepts, for whatever
a particular network represents.
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Prinz claims that the proxytypes themselves constitute cognitive content—the
stuff that’s supposed to semantically distinguish co-referring concepts (2002, p. 270).
My proxytype for J.K. Rowling might contain an image of ‘J.K. Rowling’ written on a
book, while my Robert Galbraith proxytype does not. Or my proxytype of Superman
contains an image of a guy flying around in spandex, while my proxytype for Clark
Kent contains no such thing. Presumably, such proxytypes wouldn’t even be parts of
the same long-term memory network, since (being ignorant of these identities) I have
no experience that would cause me to associate them with one another. On the other
hand, my Twin Earth counterpart and I share cognitive contents because we have
proxytypes containing the same types and weightings of feature representations. Fea-
ture representations are parts of percepts that represent particular distal properties
of that percept, and count as the same type if they represent the same perceptually
detectable distal properties (e.g. being red, being an edge).
I am not convinced that possessing a common set of feature representations can
capture what Prinz means by having the same cognitive content. Quite a few different
proxytypes, with what Prinz would presumably say have different cognitive contents,
share feature representations. A proxytype for a square will contain exactly the
same primitive features as one of a diamond, for example. Prinz might solve this by
requiring that the feature representations occur in the same way in the proxytype.
But this would seem to have the result that the only people who share proxytypes
are Twin Earth counterparts, since all of us normal folks are likely to have slight
differences in our perceptual experiences of things. Maybe that is OK, since it seems
to only be Twin Earth examples that motivate the demand for cognitive content. I
won’t push too hard on this because (a) I don’t care about the psychology of science
fiction creatures, and (b) I don’t think there is any such thing as cognitive content
anyway (see §2.4).
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Putting cognitive content to the side, a more pressing project is to explain how
proxytypes get their intentional content. For this, Prinz (2002) borrows a page from
causal-informational semantics:
X is the intentional content of C if
IC1 Xs nomologically co-vary with tokens of C and
IC2 an X was the incipient cause of C. (2002, p. 251)
Nomological co-variation is standard fare for informational semantics.4 The “incipient
cause” condition is Prinz’s way of handling the disjunction problem—that a concept
would refer to the disjunction of everything it happens to covary with. For example,
certain small bushes may reliably cause turkey representations on dark nights. The
IC2 makes it so that 〈turkeyanimal〉 represents turkeys, and only turkeys if a turkey
encounter caused 〈turkeyanimal〉 to come into existence.
This theory faces an immediate problem. If a concept has turkey as its intentional
content, it must have all and only turkeys in its extension. But this isn’t the case with
Prinz’s proxytypes. My visual representation of a turkey fanning its tail would have
been created during an encounter with a living turkey. My olfactory representation
of a roasting turkey (let’s hope) was not. These proxytypes neither share an incipient
cause, nor do they co-vary with the same things. Worse still, this makes a mess of
our inferential abilities. Suppose I’m thirsty, and think to myself “I need to get a cup
for some water.” In doing so, I represent cup using the perceptual representations of
a conical waxed paper cup. I look around and see styrofoam cups, thinking to myself
“there are some cups,” but this time my cup concept is an image of these cups. I
cannot infer that that’s the sort of thing I need, since that’s not the object I initially
pictured. My mental processors have no way of knowing that these are concepts of
the same thing, since they look different in working memory.
4c.f. Dretske (1981)
29
Prinz (2005) is aware of these problems in his (2002) formulations. Here he offers
a different account, which recruits the detection capabilities of long-term memory
networks to do the work of conferring intentional content on proxytypes. On this
version, to be a proxytype referring to X is to derive from a long-term memory
network that nomologically co-varies with X and which had X as its incipient cause.
So now both my turkey representations refer to turkeys because they come from
the turkey network—the network whose activation co-varies with turkeys, and was
initially created upon a turkey encounter.
This should suffice to give a reasonably clear picture of what Prinz’s theory is. In
what follows, I will argue that it is unworkable.
2.3 Problems with proxytypes
Prinz’s theory faces two main problems: (1) its account of intentional content locks
on to the wrong targets, does not actually explain how concepts get their content,
and leads to problems for individuating concepts; and (2) it fails to be compositional.
These problems are not without solutions. Unfortunately for Prinz, the solutions
render his theory functionally indistinguishable from atomism.
Proxytypes and Reference
Prinz’s (2005) theory of reference says that concepts, qua proxytypes, determi-
nately have X as their intentional content because they derive from networks that act
as X detectors, and had X as their incipient cause.
What do the networks detect?
The incipient cause constraint leads to serious problems nailing down the referent
of concepts. This is because what causes a network to exist sometimes ends up being
different from what the network eventually detects, and because a network’s cause is
often indeterminate.
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Suppose that as a child I watched cartoons featuring cartoon cows. These are my
first ever cow-like experiences, and my mind stores some of my visual and auditory
representations of cows in long-term memory. Later in life, I see real cows. They
look similar enough to the cartoons that I match them to the elements in the network
containing these cartoon percepts, and add these percepts them as additional links.
Over time I collect more percepts of real cows, and these gain much more weight than
the original representations in the network. That is, I treat them as more reliable
detectors for whatever the network detects. Whenever I see a cow, this network
is activated. While it also gets activated when I see cartoon cows, I may reliably
distinguish depictions from the real thing if, upon viewing cartoons, both this network
and my cartoon detecting network fire off at the same time. (Well, maybe. It seems
as if I would actually be misrepresenting something as both a cartoon and a cow. See
my remarks on compositionality below.)
What do proxytypes deriving from this network represent? Intuitively, it repre-
sents cows. After all, the network is nomologically activated by cows, most of the
percepts it contains were caused by cows, and the cow-caused percepts are the most
highly weighted. But the proxytypes cannot represent cows. The network was created
by an image of a cartoon cow, which is not a cow. It does not matter what caused
subsequent percepts to come into being, since intentional content is determined by
the network’s incipient cause. At best, if Prinz is correct, these proxytypes represent
looking like a cow ; at worst I am constantly misrepresenting all cows as cartoon cows.
Counterpoint: The cartoon cow has a special causal relation to cows (by way of
the artist’s cow network). So perhaps that is, somehow, enough to fix the incipient
cause as cows—by deference to an expert.
Response: You can run the same sort of cases with something that bears no causal
relations to what the network seems to detect. Suppose I am at a farm and see an
alpaca for the first time. I ask what that is, and a misinformed friend tells me it’s
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a baby llama. Into long-term memory the percept goes, and I spend the rest of the
day looking up llama pictures and videos, and adding them to my long-term memory
network. Fascinated, I go on to become a llama expert over the course of many
years. Along the way, I acquire a network of exclusively alpaca percepts, and, being
an expert, can easily distinguish them from llamas. I never realize that that hazily
remembered percept from years and years ago was actually an alpaca. If Prinz’s
theory of reference is correct, I, the llama expert, do not even have a llama concept.
Since the network’s incipient cause is distinct from what it causally co-varies with,
then it doesn’t seem to mean anything at all, on Prinz’s theory. Or perhaps it means
the sort of thing that looks like so, which is still not a llama concept and would also
seem to require that it detect alpacas too.
In a related worry, the incipient cause constraint does not allow the theory to
pick out a determinate referent. Suppose my first encounter with Thin Mint cookies
was seeing a sleeve of the cookies on a table. This image gets dumped into memory.
I then eat the whole sleeve (minus the wrapper) and gain a slew of new percepts
that get linked with my initial image of the cookie sleeve. Now I have a Thin Mint
network. Do proxytypes deriving from it represent the cookies themselves, or sleeves
of cookies? This network’s activation reliably co-varies with both individual cookies
and with cookie sleeves. Its incipient cause was likewise both. There is no determinate
fact as to whether the proxytypes in this network represent Thin Mint, or Thin
Mint sleeves (misrepresenting individual Thin Mints as sleeves), or Thin Mints or
Thin Mint sleeves. Clearly the most plausible interpretation is that it represents the
individual cookies, but that’s a matter of our interpretation as theorists. Nothing in
Prinz’s semantic theory can distinguish between these possibilities.
Prinz might avail himself of non-semantic resources to try and solve this problem.
The most plausible candidates are the different types of links he envisions as holding
between items in long-term memory networks, using the following taxonomy: Trans-
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formation links hold between representations that are permissible transformations of
each other (e.g., an image of a sleeve of Thin Mints sitting still on the table, and one
of a sleeve rolling across the table). Hierarchical links are formed between represen-
tations of a thing, and representations that “zoom in” on that thing (e.g., an image
of a cookie sleeve, and an image of one small group of cookies in that sleeve). Binding
links hold between items from different sensory modalities on the basis of their being
co-instantiated (e.g., the sound of the cookie crunching and the taste of the cookie).
Situational links hold between percepts that co-occur but are not physically bound to
one another (e.g., someone eating a Thin Mint might cause us to bind other percepts
of that person with other Thin Mint percepts). Predicative links join similar repre-
sentations when we are disposed to transfer the features of one percept to another
(e.g., though I did not bite into your Thin Mint, I am disposed to transfer the taste
features of my previous Thin Mint percepts to yours) (Prinz, 2002, pp. 145-146).
The idea would be that my Thin Mint network could determinately refer to indi-
vidual Thin Mints and not sleeves because they are not simply linked together, but
linked together via a hierarchical link, so that the sleeve is indicated as a “zoomed
out” version of the individual. So, we might think, the network represents the in-
dividual cookies because they are the common elements in each representation: a
percept of a cookie, and a zoomed out image of a cookie.
But links are two-way streets. If my cookie sleeve image is hierarchically linked
to a single cookie image, the former is a zoomed-out version of the latter, but the
cookie is also a zoomed-in version of the sleeve. The same point holds for all of the
other link types. For links to help in this scenario, there needs to be some prior way
of privileging which item is the object being detected. Neither incipient cause nor
co-variation can do the job. So, we’ve made no progress on the original problems.
Perhaps I am misinterpreting the incipient cause condition. I’ve been treating the
cause of the first percept in a network as the network’s incipient cause. But perhaps
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Prinz intends to draw a distinction between the incipient cause of the percepts and
the incipient cause of the network. The network is formed when the first link is
made. Again, however, this doesn’t solve the problems above. It does nothing to
resolve the cartoon cow case, since the original network was formed when multiple
cartoon images became linked. A more general issue is that we run into problems
identifying the incipient cause of joined networks. If I have a small network consisting
of the crinkly sound a cookie sleeve makes and the image of a cookie sleeve (joined
because they were co-instantiated) and another consisting of a cookie taste and cookie-
based emotion (also co-instantiated), and then the networks become linked (perhaps
through a situational link or transformation link), is the cookie or the sleeve the new
network’s incipient cause? Prinz does not provide us with the resources to say. A
deeper problem still is that the causal origins of networks are very different than
the things Prinz takes them to detect. A llama did not cause the link between my
alpaca representation and subsequent llama representations. While llamas caused
those subsequent representations, the link formed because these mental images (etc.)
were sufficiently similar to kick off the association process. Yet Prinz would not want
to say proxytypes from that network thereby represent that these two mental images
are similar.
All of these problems can be solved if we abandon the incipient cause constraint
in favor of some other way of solving the disjunction problem. Fodor’s (1992b) asym-
metric dependence theory would be one option. Fodor’s strategy is to say that for a
representation 〈X〉 to have intentional content Y is for:
1. 〈X〉 to causally co-vary with Y, and
2. for all Z 6=Y that cause 〈X〉
• if Y did not cause 〈X〉 Z wouldn’t either, and
• if Z did not cause 〈X〉 Y still would.
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So, for a representation 〈cow〉 to mean cow is for cows to cause its tokening, and all
other causes of that representation to asymmetrically depend on its causal connection
with cows. The fact that horses on dark nights cause 〈cow〉 tokens is only true because
cows cause 〈cow〉 tokens. If they didn’t, then dimly lit horses wouldn’t either. If,
however, horses at night did not cause 〈cow〉 tokens, the causal relationship between
cows and 〈cow〉 would be unaffected (Fodor, 1992b, pp. 90–93).
If Prinz adopted this change, then in the initial cartoon cow case the mature
network just means cows. If cartoons stopped causing it to activate, cows could still
cause it to activate. If cows stopped activating it, cartoons would not either.5 In the
llama case, after I become an expert, the network’s activity co-varies with llamas.
Any alpacas that happen to cause it (seen from a distance, perhaps) do so because
I mistake them for llamas—that is, if llamas did not cause it, the alpaca would not
either, but not vice versa. Finally, in the Thin Mint case, we might suppose that
though the network’s activity co-varies with both sleeves and individual cookies, if
the causal link between individual cookies and the representation were broken, the one
between sleeves and the representation would be too, but not the other way around.
The above criticisms depend on unique features of Prinz’s (2002, 2005) version
of neo-empiricism. They would not apply to other versions of concept empiricism.
This is because proxytype theory depends on neither the “contents” of the percepts
themselves nor the similarity relations between empirical concepts and the world to
5Alternatively, neither might depend on the other. Cartoons would still cause it if cows didn’t,
and cows would still cause it if cartoons didn’t. In this case, it is an ambiguous network. It could
mean the disjunction of cow or cartoon cow, or perhaps looks roughly like this. Atomism does not face
the same sort of problem because the causal relations hold between concepts and what they represent,
not between concepts, detection networks, and referent. Because of this, atomic concepts can use
many different resources to maintain their asymmetric dependence supporting causal connection to
their referent. They may even use one or more Prinzean long-term memory networks to do so. So
if one network causes an X concept to co-vary with some non-X things, the fact that the rest of its
connections make sure that, should that link be severed, it would still co-vary with X. The reason
Prinz cannot use the same sort of strategy because proxytypes have to issue from a single detection
network.
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determine conceptual content. This is a virtue of his theory, and one of the reasons
I chose it as my target. Other neo-empiricist theories either do not offer a semantic
theory (e.g., Damasio (1994)), or rely on the similarity, or alleged semantic properties
of percepts to play a significant part in content determination. Those that adopt the
latter strategy do so to their detriment. Barsalou (1999), for example, claims that
percepts themselves are intentional, and that their content partially determines the
reference of the concepts they constitute:
There is good reason to believe that perceptual representations can
and do have intentionality. Pictures, physical replicas, and movies often
refer clearly to specific entities and events in the world. (1999, p. 597)
He then says that the other determiners are things external to the concept. He does
not have in mind causal co-variation, but rather things like a concepts’ occurring in
a particular definite description. (This is the only example he gives, so I am not sure
what other external factors he thinks determine content.) He considers the sentence,
“the computer on my office desk is broken,” and says:
On hearing this sentence, imagine that a listener constructs a per-
ceptual simulation of a computer. The content of this simulation is not
sufficient to specify its reference, given that it could refer to many com-
puters. However, when conjoined... with the simulation that represents
the region “on my office desk,” the complex simulation that results estab-
lishes reference successfully, assuming that only one computer resides in
this region. (1999, p. 597)
Neither of the above claims withstand philosophical scrutiny. Barsalou cites Goodman
(1976) as evidence for the claim that pictures (etc.) have intentionality. But Goodman
did not claim that pictures (etc.) can have intentional content by themselves. Indeed,
he derided the resemblance theory of pictorial representation that this would suggest
as the “most na¨ıve view of representation” (1976, 3). Instead, he argued that pictures
(etc.) only have content relative to a conceptual schemata for interpretation (1976, 7-
9). This more informed view cannot account for conceptual content, since it requires
conceptual content to do the content determining work. Or, put more simply: images
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have content because we interpret them to, but concepts do not. And the definite
description account of reference is a non-starter. As Kripke (1980) argues, every
definite description we have about someone may be false, yet our concept for them
would still refer to that person. (Kripke’s argument is about words and names, but
the point transfers.) I can think that the computer on my desk is broken, referring to
a particular computer, even if, unbeknown to me, someone moved it from the desk.
Information semantics is a much more promising route towards content deter-
mination. While the specifics of Prinz’s (2005) and his (2002) do not hold up, the
revision I suggested above does make it more plausible. But even this is not enough
to solve proxytype theory’s reference problems.
How do proxytypes get their content?
Let’s suppose that causal co-variation accounts of content work. Representations
refer to the things they causally co-vary with (plus some account to overcome the
disjunction problem). On Prinz’s (2005) view, the things that causally co-vary with
their putative referents are networks, not proxytypes. Proxytypes cannot, in fact, co-
vary with these things. My roasted turkey imagery will not co-vary with live turkey
instances (suppose), and vice versa.
Instead, Prinz holds that proxytypes get their putative content by deriving from a
network that bears the right co-variation relation. But being part of something that
co-varies with X is an altogether different relation from co-varying with X. Causal
co-variation is a form of informational semantics. Informational semantics is plau-
sible because it is based on a lawful link between a representation and the thing it
represents. Prinz has gotten rid of this lawful relation at the level of concepts.
Lawful co-variation is a requirement on carrying information about something.
Without it, Prinz does not have an informational semantics for proxytypes. This is
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not itself a problem, but we need some reason to think that this new “derived from
a reliable detector network” theory is content determining.
Prinz does not provide one. He introduces the idea in his (2005), exchanging the
term ‘file’ for what he previously called ‘long-term memory networks’ (there seems
to be no substantive difference). Here is what he there in defense of network (or file)
derivation being a content determining relation:
There is a reliable causal relationship between encounters with mem-
bers of a category and representations derived from the file for that cat-
egory. My Pomeranian representation is not reliably caused by dogs, in
general. It might not be activated when I encounter a sheep dog. But
my Pomeranian representation is a member of a mental file containing
variable dog representations, and these collectively are reliably caused by
dogs. (2005, p. 6, emphasis added)
Let me pause here to note that it is not true that the members of a long-term memory
network are collectively reliably caused by their referents. Or, at least, Prinz is
equivocating when saying so. It may be true that for every perceived dog, there
exists some part of the network that is activated. And if we consider the network to
be activated when any of its parts are, or a sufficient number or weight of its parts
are, then we might say that the network reliably co-varies with dogs. But this is
placing a technical definition on what counts as a network being activated, and it
differs significantly from our ordinary understanding of collective relations. Though
any random 10 one-gram weights grabbed from a box of 50 will cause an accurate
scale to indicate 10-grams, the entire sack of weights does not collectively cause the
scale to indicate 10-grams, no matter how many times I repeat the action. Nor would
a group of 10 people collectively cause a cake to disappear if only three people ate
any. And a group that reliably votes 60/40 for a particular candidate in multiple
elections may collectively elect the candidate (since “to elect X” is to participate in
an election where X wins), but they do not collectively vote for the candidate. So, I
think Prinz is asserting a less tenuous causal relation between members of a long-term
memory network and the category the network detects than he is entitled to. At any
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rate, even if I am wrong about the semantics, all this gets us is that the networks
have the content dog, not the proxytypes. Prinz goes on to say how he thinks content
transfers to the proxytypes:
In other words, dog encounters reliably cause us to access the dog file.
Items in the dog file are, in that sense, under the nomological control of
dogs. Items in a mental file can be said to refer to the category that
the file reliably detects. Thus, the nomological condition on reference can
be met, even if the representations we use to categorize dogs are highly
variable. (2005, p. 6)
This is no more than hand-waving. In what sense, exactly, are particular items in
the dog network under the nomological control of dogs? There is no law-like relation
that holds between any given percept and dog instances. And why should it be said
that these particular items refer to whatever the category detects? There is likewise
no nomological relation between the network’s activation and a given proxytype’s
instantiation. Further, while Prinz is trying to make the case that parts of the network
bear some sort of causal connection to the network’s category, he is not telling us how
proxytypes get this content. Proxytypes are the copies of parts of the network tokened
in working memory. These bear even less of a nomological relation to their alleged
referents since they are not technically part of the network that gets activated, but
are rather derived from parts of this network.
The burden of proof in showing that this “derived from” relation is content de-
termining is on Prinz. There are plenty of cases where being part of something that
represents X, or derived from part of something that represents X, does not suffice
for representing X. If one had letter blocks spelling ‘cow’, pulling out the ‘o’ block
would not thereby make that single block represent cows. Nor would a photocopy of
half of the word ‘empiricism’ represent empiricism. And the concept 〈cow〉 does not
mean brown cow even though it is a constitutive part of the more complex concept
〈brown cow〉.
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These problems could be avoided if at least one element of a network is always
activated when the relevant category is detected, and that element is present in all
proxytypes for that network. This way, at least part of every proxytype would nomo-
logically co-vary with category instances. Let’s call this the ‘key percept’.
How are proxytypes individuated?
Percepts can belong to many different networks, according to the proxytype model.
An image of Daisy the cow may occur in both my cow detector network and to my
Daisy detector network. It is also possible, following my emendation above, for the
same percept to be the key percept for multiple networks. Daisy may be the very
model of a cow for me, with the same image being the key percept in both cow and
Daisy networks. Or, more likely, one network’s key concept may be a non-key element
of another. Since proxytypes can be constructed from any percepts in a network, it
is possible for working memory to contain indiscernible proxytypes standing for the
same thing. This might happen if, for example, I think “Daisy is a cow.” The most
relevant percepts in my cow network in this context will be of Daisy, as will the Daisy
percepts.
This is a problem. In order for my mind to distinguish between cow thoughts
and Daisy thoughts, there must be something it can use to tell which concept is
which. And I need it to distinguish between them so that it can reliably make truth-
preserving inferences. If I believe that Daisy only eats oatmeal, and that Bessie is a
cow, but my Daisy and cow concepts are indiscernible, I might falsely conclude that
Bessie eats oatmeal:
1. 〈MOOO only eats oatmeal.〉
2. 〈Bessie is a MOOO〉.
3. 〈Therefore, Bessie eats oatmeal.〉
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So, not only do these concepts need to be referentially distinct, they need to somehow
be distinctly marked.
Prinz’s response to this sort of worry is to appeal to the weighting and “detection
tendencies” of different proxytypes:
Two mental representations composed of the same primitives can qual-
ify as distinct proxytypes if those primitives are weighted differently. Two
such proxytypes would have different detection tendencies and perhaps
different intentional contents. (2002, p. 275)
This does not overcome the conflation problem. For one, proxytypes do not them-
selves have detection tendencies. Insofar as they might bear some sort of causal
relation to their referents, the indiscernible Daisy and cow proxytypes will bear it to
the same thing: Daisy. There is also no reason to think that the proxytypes’ weight-
ings need to be different. Their respective networks’ weightings may be different, but
the elements in the proxytype may nonetheless be weighted the same. So, it looks
like we need an additional resource to explain how the mind distinguishes symbols
from distinct networks.
On the other side of this coin, my mind needs to be able to tell when two symbols
come from the same network. Suppose 〈<hoofs, moos, black spots>〉 is one of my
proxytypes for cow, and 〈<moos, brown, wears a bell>〉 is another (〈<moos>〉 being
the key percept). If my desire to feed a cow is represented like this:
〈I want to feed a <hoofs, moos, black spots>〉
And my belief that Daisy is a cow is represented like this:
〈Daisy is a <moos, brown, wears a bell>〉
There is nothing to allow me to infer that Daisy is the sort of thing that I want to
feed. There is no way for my mind to recognize that I am deploying two concepts of
the same semantic types.
What Prinz needs, then, is something to mark all proxytypes from the same
network that is unique to that network. It can’t be a percept, because percepts will
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not be unique. We would still end up in a Daisy/cow scenario. If the marker is
not perceptual, then it is amodal. And since it will occur with all proxytypes for a
category, it can do the work the key percept was supposed to do. In turn, this amodal
marker will causally co-vary with the category the network detects.
Since the accompanying percepts are not doing any work in terms of standing for
that content, or allowing the proxytypes to be recognized and distinguished, they are
not necessary for the concept to do its work. So, we could just say that the amodal
symbol is the concept. It can be accompanied by various perceptual representations,
if that is useful for the cognitive task at hand.
Here is the picture we are left with: concepts are amodal symbols that causally
co-vary with what that concept represents. The networks still function as detection
mechanisms, but their purpose now is to maintain the causal connection between the
amodal symbol and its referent.
This modified view overcomes all of the problems I have raised for Prinz. It is
not an empiricist theory, but it is compatible with some of the neo-empiricists’ ideas
(e.g., that we sometimes use mental simulations when thinking about things). It is
also, you may have noticed, exactly what atomism claims. To hold on to informa-
tional semantics, it seems Prinz is required to give up neo-empiricism and become an
atomist.
Compositionality
Prinz (2002) offers a detailed, three-stage model of proxytype combination. In
the first stage, the retrieval stage, one looks for a single concept or exemplar that
corresponds to the complex concept one is trying to construct. So, a pet fish concept,
Prinz claims, is not constructed by combining fish and pet concepts. Rather, it either
has its own concept, or it is constructed by finding an exemplar that exists in both
the fish and pet networks (2002, pp. 301–302).
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If the retrieval stage is unsuccessful—no common exemplar or previously created
concept can be found—we move on to the composition stage. In this stage, the
default proxytypes for a pair of concepts are combined together into a single proxytype
using combination rules. One is “aligntegration,” Prinz’s term for a process in which
features of one concept are substituted for the features of the other, and weights are
adjusted. So, 〈striped apple〉 may be constructed by adding 〈striped〉 to the “surface
pattern attribute” of 〈apple〉 (2002, p. 303). The other combination rule is what Prinz
calls “feature pooling.” Feature pooling creates a new proxytype, and combines the
highest weighted features of the combining proxytypes in it. So, he says, 〈houseboat〉
may be constructed by mushing together the most salient features of a house concept
with those of a boat concept in a new proxytype (2002, pp. 304–306).
Finally, background knowledge is brought to bear on the composed concept to
make sure that it is coherent. This is the analysis stage of composition. This process
fills in gaps in the composed concept by drawing inferences from it, and introducing
features that were not part of the combined concepts. Prinz gives the examples of
〈nonmaterialistic〉 being added to the combined representation 〈Harvard carpenter〉,
and of the conflict between the features 〈malodorous〉 and 〈pleasant to cuddle〉 of
〈pet skunk〉 being detected and resolved by background knowledge about surgically
removing scent glands (Prinz (2002, pp. 306–307)).
Together, retrieval, composition, and analysis form Prinz’s “RCA” model for com-
position. Despite its detail, it faces some very elementary problems.
To what do combined concepts refer?
The RCA strategy comes from Prinz (2002), before he made the shift to causal
networks bearing the co-variation relation. In the original reference paradigm, recall,
the proxytypes themselves were supposed to bear the right sort of causal relation to
their referents. The problem was that the incipient causes of and causal relata to
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these proxytypes were never entire categories, but proper subsets of the categories’
extensions. So, if, in the combination stage, I were to create a concept for bespectacled
turkey, the resulting combined concept might only include features from a male turkey
and wire-rimmed glasses, resulting in a proxytype that refers to a male turkey with
wire-rimmed glasses. Close, but not close enough.
Prinz’s (2005) revised strategy actually fares worse on this front. Proxytypes are
supposed to refer to whatever their originating networks detect. Strictly speaking,
the combined concept does not derive from a network, at least not in the same way
that simple proxytypes do. We could say the new proxytype originates from two
networks, but then its referent would seem to be the union of turkeys and spectacles,
and not a bespectacled turkey.
I suspect that Prinz is implicitly relying on a similarity model of reference here,
instead of an informational model. The reason he thinks that these combined con-
cepts refer to particular complex categories is not because they are causally related
to them, but because they have the features that prototypical members of those cat-
egories might have. This leads to all of the classic problems for similarity views, and
prototypes as semantic determiners.6 In brief, many things are similar to the stored
bespectacled turkey representation that aren’t bespectacled turkeys (e.g., a plush
turkey doll with glasses, a monocled turkey, or a particularly large chicken wearing
Ray-Bans). And many bespectacled turkeys are not particularly similar (e.g., a dead
and plucked turkey wearing glasses, or a turkey wearing glasses with a very convincing
pilgrim costume).
Reference problems also arise at the retrieval stage. If the same exemplar exists in
my pet network and my fish network (one depicting a goldfish), and that is supposed
to serve as a pet fish concept, it is difficult to see why it would mean pet fish instead of
6See Fodor and Pylyshyn (2014, ch. 2) for a recent discussion.
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pet, or fish, or goldfish, or pet or fish or goldfish or pet fish, etc. Again, Prinz’s (2005)
model only makes things worse. Here we have distinct yet indiscernible exemplars
in different networks. It is no longer a simple matter to say which is the exemplar
used. It matters which one, because the new proxytype’s semantics are supposed to
be determined by the originating network. If it is a copy of one particular exemplar,
it can’t mean pet fish; it can only mean what the originating network detects. But
if it is a copy of neither, then it doesn’t mean anything. If it is a copy of both,
yielding a proxytype with two goldfish exemplars, and both exemplars retained their
progenitors’ referents, then perhaps it could refer to the intersection of fish and pets.
But without something like the amodal network-marker I proposed above, there is
nothing that pushes for the pet fish content instead of two goldfish, etc. And with the
amodal marker... well, who needs the exemplars?
What happened to systematicity?
Part of what compositionality is supposed to explain is the systematicity of thought.
Prinz’s RCA model does not. This is because while it provides a theory of composi-
tion, it has nothing to say about decomposition—breaking a complex representation
into its constituent parts. But decomposition is equally important to systematicity.
Anyone who can think of a large fish and a pet bear is able to think of a pet fish and
a large bear. Yet someone who has a proxytype for pet bear and large fish cannot au-
tomatically do this. The proxytypes do not contain distinct elements for the terms in
the compound. The largeness of the fish is property of the fish, not an independently
meaningful element. Even if the percepts standing for the fish’s size properties could
be transferred to parts of the pet bear proxytype, it would yield a proxytype of some-
thing that is large for a fish, yet quite a bit smaller than an average bear. Moreover,
a 〈pet bear〉 proxytype will not have any of the features that our prototypical pets
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have. So it seems unlikely that that representation could be spun off into a reliable
pet detection network.
So, the RCA model cannot provide a truly compositional semantics, and it violates
the systematicity desiderata that Prinz himself set out. For these reasons, and the
fact that it lacks a feasible theory of reference, I believe that proxytype theory is not
an adequate theory of concepts. Prinz believes the same of atomism. I want to turn
now to his criticisms of this view.
2.4 Prinz’s criticisms of atomism
Prinz (2002) offers two general lines of attack against atomism. One is that
cognitive content cannot be a purely formal property because the difference between
concepts must be epistemically accessible. The other is that the notion of form is
borderline incoherent, and no consistent reading can account both for behavioral
similarity across Twin Earth cases and yield shareable concepts.
Must senses be epistemically accessible?
Atomism says the mind distinguishes concepts purely by their formal (that is,
non-semantic) properties. Prinz argues that cognitive contents must be distinguished
by epistemically accessible features, and since formal features are not epistemically
accessible, they cannot be used to distinguish cognitive contents. He motivates this
claim by describing how someone might distinguish their own co-referring but cogni-
tively distinct concepts: Suppose, he says, that Sally has two concepts of Farrakhan.
How might she determine that she has two different concepts? By appealing to fea-
tures like “this concept is about an orator, but the other is about a musician” (Prinz,
2002, pp. 96–97). Prinz claims that she can only make this distinction because the
concepts contain epistemically accessible features.
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In what he puts forward as a related line of reasoning, Prinz asks how we might
discover that two people share a concept. He gives an example in which Ollie has
a concept of Austria that he expresses as ‘Austria’, and Otto has a concept that
he expresses as ‘O¨sterreich’. Ollie and Otto come to find that they have the same
concept by comparing their beliefs, and finding a common core. In both this and
the Farrakhan case, Prinz says, we point to certain beliefs that the people have. In
neither case would we point to formal features (Prinz, 2002, pp. 96–97).
It is unclear what Prinz thinks a theory of concepts is supposed to be explaining in
these cases. The first case suggests that he thinks figuring out whether two concepts
co-refer is discoverable a priori. But this is a peculiar demand. It was not in his initial
list of desiderata, and we have every reason to think this is not true (the existence of
Frege cases would seem to put this idea to rest).
Perhaps he is thinking that it must merely be possible for people to have distinct,
co-referring concepts and know it. Fair enough, but nothing atomism says is incom-
patible with this. Presumably one would not discover this a priori, so the concepts
themselves would not need to have epistemically accessible features. Instead, one
might have epistemically accessible beliefs which turn out to be false. For example,
〈Farrakhanorator is not Farrakhanmusician〉. So it’s not the concept’s features that need
to be epistemically accessible, but rather beliefs. And, a theory of concepts does not
need to explain how we know our own beliefs (and thank goodness for that).
In the Ollie/Otto case, the participants are not actually verifying that they share
the same concepts. They’re verifying that their words refer to the same thing. As
Prinz well knows, distinct concepts can refer to the same thing. So trying to verify
that two people have the same concepts would require quite a bit more work than
just pointing to a map and saying “this is the place I mean by ‘Austria’.” (In fact, as
I will argue in the next chapter, verifying that two people have the same concepts is
rather a hopeless endeavor, and not one worth engaging in.) Since all they need to do
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is figure out that they’re talking about the same thing, they only need to examine and
express some of their beliefs (e.g., that Austria is here on the map). The structure of
concepts simply just doesn’t factor in.
Is formal individuation incoherent?
Atomism handles Frege cases by claiming that co-referring concepts can be for-
mally distinct. The reason I can rationally believe that Superman flies, and disbelieve
that Clark Kent does, is because the Superman concept in the first belief has differ-
ent non-semantic features (think, roughly, orthographic features) than the concept
referring to the same person in the second belief.
Prinz (2002) correctly notes it is not at all clear what formal features are. He
suggests three different possible accounts (p. 97). Token concepts could have the
same form if they share either:
1. physical properties,
2. intentional content, or
3. conceptual role.
Prinz quickly dismisses the first option by saying that it would require the type-
identity theory to be true in order for two concept tokens to share cognitive content.
The second he dismisses because it would fail to explain Frege cases. The third he
dismisses because it runs afoul of the publicity desideratum on a theory of concepts.
Atomists would agree that intentional content cannot individuate concepts. The
very definition of formal features, as Fodor (1998) uses the term, is to be non-semantic.
Prinz’s blithe dismissal of the first possibility is, however, unwarranted. Recall
that cognitive content is supposed to explain two things. One is how Twin Earth
counterparts can have analogous behavioral dispositions despite lacking co-referring
terms. The other is making sense of Frege cases. Prinz errs in thinking that atomists
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recruit formal features to do both, that form is identified with cognitive content. What
atomists actually say is that there is no such thing as cognitive content. You don’t
need semantic similarities to explain either thing that cognitive content is presumed
to explain.
If formal features are physical properties, we can explain Frege cases by saying
that people have two physically discernible concepts that refer to the same thing.
These differences need not be epistemically available for the reasons given above.
That’s good, because you can’t do neurology through introspection.
Prinz levels another objection against identifying form with physical properties.
In its entirety, it is that doing so “renders it virtually impossible for the same concept
to be tokened twice” (2002, p.97). He gives no argument for this claim, other than
saying that its falsity would require the type-identity theory to be true. I agree that
it may be virtually impossible, outside of Twin Earth cases, for two distinct people
to have concepts with the same form. But why should they? All form needs to do
is provide a way for a single mind to keep track of its symbols, and allow distinct
concepts to refer to the same thing. And within a single mind, the same set of physical
properties can be realized many times, in many ways.7
Behavioral similarities can be explained by causal role. My counterpart’s XYZ
concept plays exactly the same causal role in his psychology as my water concept
does in mine. Because of this, our dispositions to behave will be the same. Prinz’s
complaint seems to be that for us to explain similar behavior in cases where people
lack co-referential terms (e.g. Twin Earth cases), it needs to be possible to share
conceptual roles. And this is virtually impossible, since two people will almost never
share concepts with exactly the same conceptual role. But Twin Earth counterparts
share exactly the same conceptual roles by design, so that’s not a problem for the
7For a full defense of this see chapter 3 for an argument that form need not be shared, and chapter
4 for an argument that physical properties can—indeed must—individuate lexical symbol types.
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atomist. And regular, non-science fiction people may not have the same exact roles,
but they can have sufficiently similar roles, affording sufficiently similar behavior.8 I
admit to being puzzled by this criticism. Unless there is some reason to think that
we have the exact same behavioral dispositions and do not in those cases have the
same causal role, I can’t see why this doesn’t do just what Prinz wanted of cognitive
content.
Note also that neither of these complicate the theory. Every theory must allow
that concepts have physical properties and causal roles. Atomism simply recruits
these extant features to do more work.
2.5 Last gasps
What this chapter has shown is that proxytype theory, seemingly the most philo-
sophically sophisticated version of neo-empiricism, fails on several fronts. Its theory
of reference delivers the wrong results in many different ways, and it makes a mess
of compositionality. I suggested fixes for each of these problems, but the end result
was simply an amodal theory—atomism with idle percepts tacked on. Additionally,
Prinz’s criticisms of atomism rested on misunderstandings about the role of concep-
tual structure, and atomism’s take on cognitive content (viz. there is none).
There is one final objection Prinz raises that bears further thought. If concepts
are individuated by formal features, and formal features are something like physical
properties (or are otherwise unique to each individual thinker), then it seems like no
one shares concepts (2002, p. 97). That is, no two people have tokens of the same
type of concepts. So, atomism fails to meet the publicity requirement after all.
8N.B. this has nothing to do with content holism. The similarity governs behavioral similarity,
and nothing semantic.
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I think this criticism is exactly right. Atomism is incompatible with the publicity
requirement. But I draw a different moral than Prinz. In the next chapter, I will
argue that the publicity requirement should be abandoned.
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CHAPTER 3
THERE ARE SOME THINGS YOU JUST CAN’T SHARE
In this chapter I want to challenge a doctrine common to both philosophy and
psychology: that concepts are the sorts of things people can and do share.1 One
reason offered in its support is that communication is possible only if concepts are
shared. Gelman and Kalish (2006) write, for example, that “shared concepts are a
prerequisite for communication,” and claim that “[i]t is only because two people share
the concept dog that they can talk about dogs” (p. 719).2 The other reason given in
support of this doctrine is that shared concepts are required to capture intentional
laws and generalizations. Fodor (1998) takes this line, arguing that people must be
able to share a water concept if a generalization like “thirsty people seek water” is to
apply to more than one person (p. 29).
Despite this apparent support, the doctrine leads to a puzzle. Consider a case
where an individual has multiple concepts referring to the same thing. Someone
ignorant of the chemical structure of water may, for example, believe that water is
safe to drink but H2O is not, indicating that they have two distinct concepts referring
to water. Call these 〈W〉 and 〈H〉. Would such a person share concepts with someone
who only has one water concept (call it 〈Z〉)? People like this could, at least in some
1c.f. Carey (2009); Fodor (1998); Gauker (2011); Gelman and Kalish (2006); Laurence and
Margolis (1999) (in terms of “stability”); Prinz (2002); Rey (1983) (in terms of “interpersonal
stability functions”).
2Gelman and Kalish (2006) explicitly note that there is a tension here, though not the one that
will concern us in this chapter. In the same sentence they say that concepts will differ in some ways
between different people and person stages. The lesson they take from this is that sharing must
allow for some conceptual differences. My arguments here contend that any talk of the concept of
something is mistaken, so there is no sense in which people share that concept.
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circumstances, communicate about water, and at least some water generalizations
would subsume them both. So it seems they must share concepts. But which concept,
〈W〉 or 〈H〉 do they share? It cannot be both; if 〈W〉 is the same type of concept as
〈Z〉, then 〈H〉 must be a different type of concept from 〈Z〉 since 〈W〉 is a different type
of concept from 〈H〉. But neither has more claim than the other on being the water
concept, since we can imagine each playing the role of facilitating communication
about water in different circumstances. So, it seems, some concept must be shared,
but neither can be.
I argue that puzzles like the above reveal fatal flaws in the motivations for the
shareability thesis. The argument from intentional generalizations rests on an equiv-
ocation between shared conceptual content and shared conceptual vehicles. The ar-
gument from communication leads to logical contradiction. The shareability thesis is
thus unmotivated, and should not constrain theories about the nature of concepts.
I propose a counterpart model, analogous to Lewis’s (1973) counterpart theory for
modality, that exchanges cross-personal concept identity for a context-dependent sim-
ilarity relation between distinct concepts. This model not only avoids the problems I
raise for shared concepts, but better explains concepts’ role in communication without
positing additional theoretical apparatus. Additionally, I argue that the counterpart
model may pay dividends in the philosophy of language by pointing the way toward
a resolution of several long-standing puzzles about belief reports.
3.1 The shareability thesis
I wish to dispute the doctrine that concepts must be shareable. What defenders of
the doctrine mean by “share” is different than the sense in which, say, two cars share
a garage, or a library shares its books. In these cases multiple individuals in some
sense possess numerically identical objects. What defenders of the doctrine have in
mind is instead more precisely characterized as what I will call the shareability thesis :
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Shareability thesis: Distinct people can, and commonly do, have token
concepts of exactly the same type.
The shareability thesis, if true, substantively constrains conceptual theories. Con-
cepts, qua explanatory posits in cognitive science, are the constituents of propositional
attitude states (beliefs, hopes, fears, etc.). This means that they must be mental par-
ticulars. Since people do not have numerically identical mental particulars in common,
sharing concepts must be understood as a type/token relationship: to share a concept
with someone is to have a token concept of exactly the same type as one of theirs.
If we accept the claim that concepts are shareable, we can use this as a check on
theories of concepts. These theories aim, among other things, to explain how concepts
are individuated. If the individuation conditions they give make it impossible or
improbable that two people have token concepts of the same type, then, because
concepts are shareable, that theory should be rejected.
Fodor and Lepore (1992) dismiss theories committed to semantic holism on these
grounds. They argue that if concepts are at least partly individuated by their con-
tent, and conceptual content is determined by the totality of one’s beliefs (as holistic
theories claim), then virtually nobody shares concepts, since practically everybody
has some belief that is unique to them. Ironically, Prinz (2002) turns this line of
reasoning back on Fodor. Fodor (1998, 1995, 2007) holds that distinct concepts can
have the same referential content if they are different “formal” types. Prinz (2002)
argues that to do this work, formal types either have to be physical types—in which
case it is improbable that anyone would share them—or functional roles—in which
case it seems as if Fodor is led to holism, and thus to the very problem he identified
(pp.95-7).
Though Fodor (1998, 2004) and Prinz (2002) endorse very different theories about
the nature of concepts, their reasons for endorsing the shareability thesis are the same.
They argue that it is needed to capture explanatory generalizations in psychology, and
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to enable linguistic communication.3 The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that
the shareability thesis is false. Rather, I will argue that it is unmotivated. Neither of
the two arguments given in support—the argument from intentional generalizations,
and the argument from communication—succeed.
3.2 The argument from intentional generalizations
Many explanatory claims in psychology are intentional. They provide reasons
for someone’s behavior, asserting a causal relation between that behavior and some
mental states specified by their contents. Consider the following example:
(1) Yvonne went to the library because she wanted a book, and believed the
library was the best place to get it.
This simple case explains a behavior (going to the library) in terms of some mental
states (a desire and a belief) individuated by their content (that Yvonne get a book
and that the library was the best place to get that book). Prinz (2002) uses an example
like this to motivate the shareability thesis. Notice, he says, that these sorts of
explanations can apply to multiple people:
(2) Xavier and Yvonne went to the library because they wanted a book, and
believed the library was the best place to get it.
This ascribes the same set of attitudes to two people. If they have the same
attitudes and attitudes are composed of concepts, Prinz reasons, then they must have
the same concepts. So, he argues, the fact that we can subsume multiple people under
the same intentional explanation shows that concepts are shareable (2002, pp.14-15).
3Because they make these arguments explicitly, I will be focusing on Fodor and Prinz, but these
same lines of reasoning are implicit in other defenders of the thesis. Carey’s (2009) concerns about
“disagreement” are a special case of communication, for example (p.497). And Rey’s (1993) defense
of analytic intuitions presents a special case of psychological generalizations (e.g., everyone with the
concept 〈bachelor〉 has the concept 〈unmarried〉).
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Fodor (1998) advances a similar argument. Intentional explanations, he claims,
require covering generalizations. According to Fodor, if ‘I was thirsty’ explains why
I got water, then there is a law-like generalization that says that thirsty people tend
to seek water. This generalization subsumes people under the same type of attitude:
a desire for water. (Or, more precisely, it subsumes people under attitudes with
the same content. As we shall see, this is the distinction that makes a difference.)
If people share this attitude, then, Fodor reasons, people must share the concept
〈water〉 because:
If everybody else’s concept WATER is different from mine, then it is
literally true that only I have ever wanted a drink of water, and that the
intentional generalization ‘Thirsty people seek water’ applies only to me.
(1998, p.29)
Fodor’s reasoning is that without shared concepts, “generalizations” are not gen-
eral, and without generalizations we do not get intentional explanations. So, he
concludes, concepts must be shareable (or “public,” as he puts it).
The particular example Fodor uses is not, perhaps, the best case for the share-
ability thesis. Plausibly, the generalization relevant to explaining my water-seeking
behavior is this: If someone wants X, and believes they can get X by doing Y, then,
ceteris paribus they will get Y. Or, in other words, people tend to try and get what
they want. This schematic generalization is not committed to any particular atti-
tudinal content. If so, it would give us the generalization that Fodor says we need
without committing us to shared attitudes and concepts.
What Fodor needs is a content dependent generalization—one where the particu-
lar content it ranges over plays an important role in the explanation. Here is one such
example from the psychological literature on categorization: Diesendruck and Peretz
(2013) conducted a series of experiments to discover differences between children’s
categorization of artifacts and their categorization of natural kinds. In one exper-
iment, they told children a story either about a scientist who liked to create new
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kinds of artifacts, or one who liked to create new types of animals. They would then
present the children with an object that the scientist created, and ask them to put
it with the others of its kind. What they found was that while children consider the
creator’s intent relevant to determining category membership for artifacts, they do
not consider this information relevant when categorizing animals. This information
allows us to make a predictive generalization about children’s behavior:
(3) If a child believes that X is an artifact, and that X’s creator intended X to be
an F, then, ceteris paribus, they will categorize X as an F.
This is a content dependent generalization. It depends crucially on how the child
thinks of the target object. If the child does not represent the target object as an
artifact, it will not hold.4
If this is a genuine explanatory generalization, then it looks like we need to ascribe
attitudes with the same content to lots of distinct people. And this, Fodor believes,
is enough to justify the shareability thesis.
To recap, both Fodor and Prinz reason as follows: There are true intentional
explanations. The same intentional generalization can apply to distinct people. (For
the reasons given above, Fodor believes they must apply to distinct people.) This
requires that distinct people have attitudes with the same content. And this, they
conclude, means that distinct people must share concepts.
The crucial inference is the last one: that sharing attitudes with the same content
entails sharing concepts. Prinz states this explicitly, writing that “actions can be
motivated by the same attitudes only if those attitudes are composed of the same
concepts” (2002, 15). Fodor leaves the inference implicit. (He spends the remainder
of this section arguing that people had better have the same content, not just similar
4There are many other examples like this. For an overview of similar work in developmental
psychology, see Carey (2009) ch. 3-6.
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content (1998, pp 29-34).) This suggests that once you get attitudes with the same
content, you are supposed to get shared concepts for free.
If there is an argument to be found for this claim, I believe it is this: To say that
concepts are the constituents of attitudes is to say that concepts are the meaningful
parts of the attitudes. Both Fodor and Prinz endorse a compositional semantics for
propositional attitudes. That is, they believe that the content of an attitude is wholly
determined by the content of its constituent parts and the way those parts are put
together. So, if two token attitudes have the same content as one another, we might
reason, then they must have the same meaningful parts put together in the same way.
Since concepts are the meaningful parts of attitudes, then, it appears token attitudes
with the same content will have the same (types of) concepts as one another.
We can reconstruct the full argument as follows:
P1 There are true intentional generalizations.
P2 Intentional explanations subsume multiple people under attitudes with the same
content.
P3 If (1) & (2), then distinct people often have token attitudes with the same
content.
P4 If two token propositional attitudes have the same content, then they have the
same meaningful parts.
P5 If people often have attitudes with the same meaningful parts, then people often
have attitudes with token concepts of the same types.
P6 If people often have attitudes with token concepts of the same types, then the
shareability thesis is true.
C Therefore, the shareability thesis is true.
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I grant premises (P1)-(P3). (P4) and (P5), I will argue, rest on an equivocation.
If I am right, then the argument from intentional generalizations fails.
3.3 Decomposition and Frege cases
The argument from intentional generalizations depends on premise (P4) above:
If two token propositional attitudes have the same content, then they
have the same meaningful parts.
At a glance, it may seem that this follows from the fact that thoughts have a
compositional semantics. It does not. Hard currency has something analogous to a
compositional semantics: the amount of money some token collection of hard cur-
rency represents is wholly determined by the amount of money its constituent parts
represent. (N.B., constituent parts, not mere parts: half a dollar bill does not repre-
sent half a dollar.) Our having the same amount of hard currency, however, does not
entail our having parts that represent the same amounts. If I have five $2 bills, and
you have two $5 bills, we each have $10 in hard currency, but no constituents of my
currency represent $5 and none of yours represent $2. The upshot is that composi-
tionality does not entail (P4). One could consistently reject the latter but accept the
former.
Attitudes are, of course, different from currency in any number of ways. One
that bears on this premise is that the number of permissible compositions for a given
semantic type of attitude is fairly limited. While there are many ways of making a
US dollar with hard currency (294, counting a dollar coin and dollar bill), there are
not too many ways of breaking a belief that dogs bark into constituent parts. Most
intuitively, one would need a concept meaning dogs and another meaning bark. There
could also be a singular concept with no constituent parts that means dogs bark. It
may also be possible that the concepts meaning dogs and bark are composed of yet
more primitive concepts.
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Suppose that each semantic type of attitude can be composed in exactly one
way—that composition is monoeidic. This would mean that every token attitude of
a given semantic type also decomposes in the same way. For every meaningful part
of a token attitude, then, there would be a constituent part that means the same
thing (has the same content) in every other token attitude of that same semantic
type. For example, if the only way to compose a belief with the content dogs bark
is to combine an element meaning dogs with an element meaning bark, then every
token belief with that content has token constituents that mean dogs and bark. If
we read ‘same meaningful parts’ as ‘constituent parts with the same meaning’, then,
assuming a single permissible decomposition we get a monoeidic decompositionality,
which is just what (P4) asserts.5
There is, however, another reading available: that having ‘the same meaningful
parts’ means having meaningful parts of the same type. This is a stronger read-
ing. The weaker reading only asserts content identity between constituent parts of
content-identical attitudes, not type identity. Elements with the same content are
not necessarily type identical. Consider the English sentence ‘dogs bark’ and the
German sentence ‘Hunde bellen’. Both sentences have the same content (dogs bark),
and both have constituent parts with the same meaning (‘dogs’ and ’Hunde’ meaning
dogs, and ‘bark’ and ‘bellen’ meaning bark). But they do not have the same types of
constituent parts: ‘dogs’ and ‘Hunde’ are different types of words.
If concepts are individuated in part by non-semantic features, then the weak
and strong readings of (P4) come apart. Semantically equivalent attitude tokens
5The assumption that each semantic attitude type has a single (de)composition is, perhaps,
implausible. It is an assumption we need only if we want to guarantee that token attitudes of
the same type all have constituent parts that mean the same thing. If there are relatively few
permissible (de)compositions, then we would get a weaker version that would say attitudes with the
same content often have the same meaningful parts. The problem I am going to raise applies to the
weaker assumption as well, so for exegetical convenience I will stick with the strong version.
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could decompose into parts that have the same meaning, but different non-semantic
features.
Recall that the crucial moves in the argument from intentional generalizations
were (P4), and this:
P5 If people often have attitudes with the same meaningful parts, then people often
have attitudes with token concepts of the same types.
With a strong reading, this premise is almost trivial: Concepts just are the mean-
ingful parts of attitudes, so types of concepts are types of meaningful parts. With
a weak reading the inference requires an additional assumption: that concepts are
individuated purely by their content. If concepts are individuated in part by other
features, then—just as we cannot infer that two token sentences with the same con-
tent will include the same types of words—we cannot infer that attitudes with parts
that mean the same thing include the same types of concepts. Defenders of the ar-
gument from intentional generalizations thus must claim either that we have good
reason to read (P4) strongly (so that the antecedent of (P5) can be read strongly),
or that concepts are individuated purely by their content. Neither is true, as I shall
argue presently.
Frege cases
If we take the line that concepts are individuated by content alone, we need to
say something about what conceptual content is. The simplest idea is that contents
are referents. Famously, however, this leads us to Frege’s puzzle about substitutivity.
Substitutivity says that co-referential terms can be substituted for one another salva
veritate. So, for example, since ‘adrenalin’ and ‘epinephrine’ co-refer, then if ‘the
needle contains adrenalin’ is true, ‘the needle contains epinephrine’ must also be
true. Frege (1892) presented the following puzzle for this intuitive principle (though
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not in these terms): Suppose I do not know that ‘adrenaline’ and ‘epinephrine’ name
the same substance. It would seem possible, then, for 4 to be true, but 5 to be false:
(4) I believe the needle contains adrenaline.
(5) I believe the needle contains epinephrine.
But this would be a failure of substitutivity. Frege’s puzzle consists in explaining
how, if substitutivity is to be saved, such sentences differ in content (or, at least, why
they seem to differ in content), or why substitutivity does not apply in these contexts.
Strictly speaking, Frege’s puzzle concerns propositional attitude reports. My con-
cern here will be with the attitudes themselves. To avoid some complicating details6
I want to focus on a closely related puzzle that deals with propositional attitudes
directly. Consider the following case:
Ignorance: Blair is a hospital intern. Doctor X has asked Blair to
clean off a shelf in the supply closet. Blair’s instructions are to leave all
and only adrenaline shots on the shelf, and discard the rest. A different
doctor, Doctor Y, has a standing order to bring any discarded epinephrine
shots to her office. Blair finds several boxes labeled ‘epinephrine shot’ and,
despite there being plenty of room for them on the shelf, delivers them to
Doctor Y.
How can Blair lack the belief that would cause her to leave the boxes on the shelf,
but have the belief that causes her to bring the boxes to Doctor Y? On the one hand,
if she believed the boxes contained adrenaline shots, she would have left them on the
shelf. Since she did not, she must lack the relevant belief. At the same time, she
did bring the boxes to Doctor Y, which she would have done only if she believed the
boxes to contain adrenaline shots.
This puzzle is not about ascription. It is about the mental states themselves. We
need to explain what it is about Blair that prevents her from drawing the appropriate
inference. She has a belief with the propositional content the boxes contain adrenaline
6Kripke’s (1979) puzzles about disquotation, for example, are tied to ascription.
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shots, but fails to infer that she should leave them on the shelf (as evidenced by the
fact that she does not do this, and the assumption that she intends to cooperate).
The tempting reply is to say that she believes the boxes contain epinephrine shots
but needs to believe they contain adrenaline shots. This, of course, is just the original
puzzle over again. Posing the answer in these terms does not help solve the puzzle
about attitudes themselves since it is merely a change in ascriptive language. We still
need to know how the belief Blair has differs from the belief she needs to make the
right choice.
Frege (1892)’s own solution was to posit senses, a sort of abstract public object
mediating the connection between a representation and what it refers to. While ‘the
shots contain adrenaline’ and ‘the shots contain epinephrine’ share a referent (a truth
value, on Frege’s view), he says, they are connected to them by different senses.
In ascriptive sentences like ‘Blair believes the shots contain adrenaline’ and ‘Blair
believes the shots contain epinephrine’, Frege claims the embedded propositions (‘the
shots contain...’) refer to their senses, not their ordinary referents. And this, he says,
corresponds to a difference in the sense that Blair “grasps” when thinking one instead
of the other.
The problem with Frege’s account, as Fodor (1998) points out, is that senses
are not doing any of the work. In terms of what’s going on inside someone’s head,
it’s the grasping of a sense that distinguishes the states. But this metaphor is left
unexplained. How does the mental feat of grasping one sense differ psychologically
from grasping a different sense? Since explaining the psychological difference between
such cases is the very puzzle we are trying to solve, Frege’s solution is no help.
Another possible solution is to say that Blair suffers some failure of rationality.
She fails to draw the appropriate inference and act accordingly because something
has gone wrong with her reasoning. This is a poor response. If she were following
some faulty inference rules, we would expect errors to appear in a domain general
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fashion, whenever the rule was used. But her pattern of mistakes is not general—
it is tied to epinephrine in particular. Nor do we have any reason to suspect she
has suffered a cognitive failure of some sort, like forgetting what she is supposed to
be doing. Blair’s mistake is the product of bad information, not faulty reasoning.
Were she to get new information—that ‘epinephrine’ and ‘adrenaline’ name the same
substance—she would not make the mistake.
A much more promising—and intuitive—explanation is that Blair has two distinct
concepts that refer to adrenaline. She does not know that they co-refer—in fact she
believes that they do not—and her belief about what she is to leave on the shelf uses
one of these concepts, and her belief about what is in the boxes uses the other. So
her belief about what is in the boxes does not spur her to leave them on the shelf—it
uses the wrong vocabulary, so to speak.
This is possible only if Blair’s mental bookkeeping individuates concepts by some-
thing besides their content. Her mind must use some non-referential features to dis-
tinguish and keep track of concepts with the same content. Call these the concept’s
formal features. Suppose Blair’s two adrenaline concepts are 〈adren〉 and 〈epi〉. This
allows us to reconstruct Blair’s reasoning as follows, where the expressions are to be
read as an ersatz mental language with orthography as a proxy for concepts’ formal
features:
(6) 〈I should only leave adren shots on the shelf.〉
(7) 〈The boxes contain epi shots.〉
(8) 〈epi is not adren.〉
(9) 〈So, I should not leave the boxes on the shelf.〉
Formally, this is a consistent, valid argument. Blair is not irrational for following
this line of reasoning—a virtue of the formal features account.
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The reason she gets to a false conclusion is that she is working with bad in-
formation. Premise (8) is false. (Note that this premise is using the 〈adren〉 and
〈epi〉 concepts, not mentioning them. Blair would need a metalanguage to assert
the non-identity of her mental symbols.) This premise asserts that adrenaline is not
self-identical. But this does not properly describe her error. Indeed, there is no way
to describe her error within one semantically interpreted language. We need to be
able to talk about her mental states as an object language. What she does not know
is that 〈adren〉 and 〈epi〉 co-refer. This leads to her using (8) in a practical syllogism.
The second virtue of the “two formally distinct concepts” explanation is that it
is both predicted and explained by the dominant computational model of thought.
On this model, mental processes are sensitive only to the formal features of mental
symbols. The content of a symbol or state is itself causally inert, but the workings
of the mind are such that semantic relations are encoded in rules defined over the
formal features of symbols.
A system that works like this—one that is blind to semantics—will be susceptible
to just the sort of error Blair experiences in our example. When things go right,
there is one concept for a particular content. But when multiple concepts refer to the
same thing, the mind cannot recognize this a priori—it only responds to concepts’
formal features. The problematic premise is not a formal contradiction. Only under
semantic interpretation can we see that it says that adrenaline is not self-identical. So,
a computational system that only “sees” formal features will not be able to recognize
the error.
Before returning to the morals for the shareability thesis, I need to discuss one
more possibility. By dubbing the non-referential features of a concept ‘formal fea-
tures’, I am making a tendentious assumption that the difference between co-referring
concepts is non-semantic. Another possibility is that there is more to the semantics of
singular terms like ‘adrenaline’ (and corresponding singular concepts) than reference.
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On this view, ‘epinephrine’ and ‘adrenaline’ (and 〈epi〉 and 〈adren〉) are distinguished
by some extra layer of meaning.
This is not, however, a promising line of reply. It is ad hoc, and less parsimonious
than the formal-features reply. Computationalism demands that concepts have formal
features independently of these Frege cases. So, by relying on a single dimension
of meaning and showing how formal features solve the puzzle, we are drawing on
resources the theory already requires. Moreover, given computationalist scruples, the
extra layer of meaning is otiose. There still needs to be some way for her mind—a
physically realized system—to respond to semantic differences. And the only way to
do that is if they are encoded in non-semantic features. So, the concepts would still
need to be formally distinct.
Formal features and shareability
Let us return to the argument for the shareability thesis. The argument was that
intentional generalizations attribute states with the same content to many different
people, and:
P4 If two token propositional attitudes have the same content, then they have the
same meaningful parts.
P5 If people often have attitudes with the same meaningful parts, then people often
have attitudes with token concepts of the same types.
As I argued above, ‘same meaningful parts’ is ambiguous. (P5) requires a strong
reading according to which it means meaningful parts of the same type. And this
can happen in two ways. One is that (P4) warrants a strong reading. The other
is that (P4) only warrants a weaker reading, according to which ‘same meaningful
parts’ means parts that mean the same thing, but concepts are individuated by content
alone, so the readings collapse.
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As we have seen, accounting for Frege cases requires that concepts be individuated
(at least in part) by their formal features. So, the second possibility is a non-starter.
The first possibility is likewise unwarranted. The sort of generalizations that
motivated shareability proponents are cast in terms of content alone. The formal
features do not play any role. Consider the categorization behavior described by
Diesendruck and Peretz (2013): If children think of something as an artifact, they
will take into account its creator’s intent (e.g., the creator’s intending it to be a
whatsit is relevant to whether or not it gets put with the whatsits). If this is true,
then children have a concept that means artifact which plays that role (inter alia) in
their category judgments. The generalization picks out a concept by content alone,
and attributes a functional role to it. Any other features that the mind uses to
individuate that concept do not enter into the explanation.
Or consider a recent finding by MacNell et al. (2015) that the perceived gender of
an instructor has a significant effect on student evaluations. Students in experimental
groups were given online courses which differed only in the instructor’s name. Student
evaluations for courses where the instructor had a feminine name received worse
evaluations than (again, identical) courses where the instructor had a masculine name.
This provides evidence for the following generalization about social/psychological
gender bias: Students who think their instructors are women will tend to rate them
lower than if they thought they were men. This generalization makes a number of
assumptions about students’ gender concepts: that they associate particular names
with particular genders, that these are the concepts that enter into other attitudes
toward gender, for example. It does not, however, assume that the relevant concepts
meaning men and women have the same formal features. What matters is that
people have these concepts, and that these concepts track gender and play certain
other roles in our psychology. What features our minds use to identify, re-identify,
and distinguish these concepts are irrelevant to the explanation.
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Even generalizations that implicate these differences (e.g., that people who asso-
ciate distinct concepts with ‘epinephrine’ and ‘adrenaline’ will tend to ignore boxes la-
beled ‘epinephrine’ when asked for ‘adrenaline’) do not require shared formal features.
They only require that for each individual mind subsumed under the generalization,
some formal features or other distinguish these concepts.
If we understand the work that formal features are supposed to do, this result
should be unsurprising. Formal features play a role in internal bookkeeping. They are
what our mental processors use to distinguish the symbols that mental computations
range over. The reason our explanatory framework needs to individuate concepts
along this dimension is to capture facts about intrapersonal rationality (as in the
case of Blair, above).
This is very different from the role of content in intentional explanations. If we
want to explain why women suffer a certain sort of systematic disadvantage, we need
to talk about beliefs and biases people have about women. If we want to explain a
pattern in how children categorize artifacts versus other types of things, we need to
talk about the differences in how they think about artifacts versus other categories.
These explanations subsume concepts by content—by the same content.
If the students in the MacNell et al. (2015) study meant different things by their
gender concepts, then there is no generalization: we could not say that there is a bias
against women, but rather many different biases (against women1 for this student,
women2 for this other one, etc.). And this is Fodor’s dreaded result: The researcher’s
use of ‘women’ would pick out a meaning unique to them, so there would be no
way to state the generalization. Indeed, there would be no generalization to capture.
By contrast, if one student represents the instructor as a being a woman using a
〈woman1〉 concept, and another student represents the same thing using a formally
distinct 〈woman2〉 concept, it would still be true that they exhibit a bias against
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women, as such, if they conform to the pattern of behavior MacNell et al. (2015)
describe.
I am not claiming that such concepts do not have the same formal features across
all people. My contention here is only that intentional generalizations do not require
that the concepts they range over share formal features. The argument from inten-
tional generalizations claimed that explaining behavior requires the existence of true
intentional generalizations. It claimed further that for two people to have the same
intentional state, they must have the same types of concepts. So, it concluded, people
must have concepts of the same type—they must share concepts. As I have argued,
however, concepts are individuated in part by their formal features. The truth of in-
tentional generalizations requires only sameness of content, not formal features. This
argument fails to provide reasons for thinking concepts must be shareable.
3.4 Communication
The argument from intentional generalizations is only one of the primary supports
for the shareability thesis. The other is the idea that shared concepts are required for
successful linguistic communication. Undoubtedly, concepts play a role in communi-
cation. The question I am concerned with is whether shared concepts play any role
in communication. One compelling line of reasoning holds that they do. Successful
communication requires, minimally, understanding each other’s words. We can only
do this, the reasoning goes, if we associate the same concepts with the same words.
So, successful communication seems to require shared concepts. Prinz (2002) makes
this argument explicitly:
According to the standard picture, people understand each other’s
words in virtue of the fact that they associate the same (or quite nearly
the same) concepts with those words. If no two people associate the same
concepts with their words, then communication is impossible. Therefore,
concepts must be shareable. (14)
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The key premise is that communication requires that we associate the same con-
cepts with one another’s words. Call this the communication hypothesis. In this
section, I will argue that not only is this hypothesis false, but it leads to an outright
logical contradiction. Prinz’s hedge, allowing for ”very nearly the same” concepts is
of little help. The clearest candidate for similarity—having the same content—fails
to capture key features of concepts’ role in communication.
The problems for this hypothesis emerge in pairs of cases like the following:
Success 1: ‘Torosaurus’ and ‘triceratops’ name the same type of di-
nosaur. My nephew is a dinosaur buff, and knows this. For him, these
are two ways of expressing the same concept. I, on the other hand, do
not know this. I have two distinct concepts referring to this dinosaur,
one of which I associate with the word ‘triceratops’ and the other with
‘torosaurus’. He says to me “I want to go to the museum with the
torosaurus skull.” I know the museum—the skull is very clearly labeled
‘torosaurus’—and I take him there.
According to the communication hypothesis the fact that this communication
succeeded means that my nephew and I associate the same concept with ‘torosaurus’.
Call his univocal concept 〈T〉, and the concept I associate with it 〈torosaurus〉. So,
it seems that 〈T〉 and 〈torosaurus〉 are the same concept.
Success 2: Looking at my nephew’s shelf of dinosaur books, I ask
him if he has already read The Mighty Triceratops today. He wants to
communicate that he has, and forestall additional questioning along that
line. He says, “I’ve read all and only my books about triceratops today.”
I believe that this book is about triceratops, so I correctly infer that he
has already read it.
The concept I associate with ‘triceratops’ is 〈triceratops〉, not 〈torosaurus〉. The
communication hypothesis says that this communication’s success depends on our
associating the same concepts with the same words. Since my nephew only has the
one 〈T〉 concept, that means that it and my 〈triceratops〉 concept are the same.
So, we are led to the following problem: 〈triceratops〉 and 〈torosaurus〉 are distinct
types of concepts. 〈T〉 is the same type of concept as 〈torosaurus〉. 〈T〉 is the same
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type of concept as 〈triceratops〉. So, by transitivity, 〈torosaurus〉 and 〈triceratops〉
are the same type of concept. So, we have a contradiction.
This problem arises, of course, from requiring that people associate exactly the
same types of concepts with the same words as one another. If we relax this re-
quirement, then perhaps the problem can be avoided. Note, however, that doing so
undercuts the communication hypothesis as a motivation for shareability. The share-
ability thesis says that distinct people can, and commonly do, have token concepts of
exactly the same type. The reason for this is that the shareability thesis is supposed
to be a constraint on theories that say what concepts are. Concepts must be indi-
viduated so as to be shareable, its proponents claim. By backing away from claiming
communication requires shared concept types, we give up shareability as a restriction
on individuation.
The most obvious alternative to the strict communication hypothesis is this: suc-
cessful communication requires associating concepts with the same content with the
same words. This is compatible with both Success 1 and 2. My two concepts are not
content distinct. They have the same content as one another and as my nephew’s, so
we avoid the contradiction.
There are two issues with this move. One is that it gives a very incomplete account
of concepts’ role in communication. As we can see from the following case, it does
not provide us with the resources to explain communication failures:
Failure Looking at his shelf of dinosaur books, I ask my nephew if he
has already read The Mighty Triceratops today. He wants to communicate
that he has, and forestall additional questioning along that line. He says,
“I’ve read all and only my books about torosaurus today.” I infer that he
has not read that book, and hand it to him.
My nephew wanted me to believe that he had read the book, but I concluded that
he had not. This happened despite the fact that we associated concepts with the
same content with his utterance of ‘torosaurus’, and the instance of ‘triceratops’ in
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the title of the book. Something has gone wrong, but what? It would seem to be that
I am drawing on two different concepts where my nephew draws on one. Looking at
content alone, however, this error is invisible. And we cannot simply say that the
difference in number causes the problem, since my conceptual repertoire is the same
here as in the above successful cases. There is some relation that our concepts need
to bear to one another that is present in those cases, but missing here.
Counterpart concepts
Lewis (1973) faced an analogous puzzle about individuation across possible worlds:
the truth of counterfactuals requires that some identity like relation holds between
individuals in different possible worlds, but it cannot be identity. His solution was to
replace transworld identity with a context-dependent counterpart relation. Borrowing
from Lewis, I want to propose a counterpart model of concepts’ role in communication:
Successful communication requires not that two people associate the same concepts
with the same words, but rather that they associate counterpart concepts with the
same words.
In many contexts of communication there are certain beliefs that (1) are relevant
to the discourse and (2) the communicator expects to share with their audience.
Counterpart concepts are concepts that (a) have the same content and (b) play the
same role in all such beliefs. More schematically:
For any context of communication, C, two concepts, 〈φ〉 and 〈ψ〉 are
counterparts in C iff 〈φ〉 and 〈ψ〉 co-refer, and for any belief Φ in the
set of contextually relevant beliefs, 〈φ〉 occurs in a token belief meaning
Φ iff 〈ψ〉 occurs in the same role in a belief meaning Φ.
Note that beliefs are individuated here by propositional content alone. This allows
us to avoid problems of cross personal belief identity that would otherwise parallel
the problems of cross personal concept identity.
Like Lewis’ model, the counterpart relation for concepts is a context-dependent
similarity relation holding between distinct individuals. Context-dependence crops up
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frequently in communication. The way we choose to refer to things depends on who
we are talking to and what beliefs we share with them. I can indicate, for example,
that I think Obama is sharply dressed by saying “the president is sharply dressed”
only if you share my belief that Obama is the president. We are usually pretty good at
choosing useful ways of referring to things. The conceptual counterpart relation tracks
something similar to what we are paying attention to when we make these choices.
We have to be thinking about things in relevantly similar ways for communication
to succeed. We have to have some of the same beliefs, and the concepts we associate
with our words have to play the same role in these beliefs. Which beliefs (if any) we
need to share will depend on the context in which we are communicating.
Counterparts in Frege cases
The counterpart model can explain the variations in success and failure to com-
municate in the above cases. In Success 1, there do not seem to be any relevant
background beliefs. What my nephew intends to communicate is that he has a par-
ticular desire, and he states it overtly. For him to succeed, I only need to pick up
what he says. In a simple case like this, then, the counterpart relation is satisfied
by concepts with the same content. So, since we associate concepts with the same
content with all the words in his utterance, the communication succeeds.
Success 2 is more interesting. My nephew is expecting that I know what the
book is about. I could understand his surface utterance without any background,
but that is not all he is trying to say. He is trying to tell me something about the
book I am holding when he says “I’ve read all and only my books about triceratops
today,” viz. that he has read it. To pick up on this I need to believe that this
book is about triceratops. This belief is thus part of the set of contextually relevant
beliefs. My nephew has this belief in terms of his 〈T〉 concept. I have the same
belief (individuated by content alone) in terms of my 〈triceratops〉 concept. These
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concepts are counterparts, and we associate 〈T〉 and 〈triceratops〉 respectively with
his utterance of ‘triceratops’, so communication succeeds.
In Failure, the belief that the book is about triceratops is still relevant. We each
still share this belief, mine in terms of 〈triceratops〉 and his in terms of 〈T〉. But the
concept I associate with ‘torosaurus’ when he says “I’ve read all and only my books
about torosaurus today” is 〈torosaurus〉. This is not a counterpart to his 〈T〉 concept
since it does not occur in the contextually relevant attitude. So, since we failed to
associate counterpart concepts with the same word, communication fails.
Putting counterparts to work in other cases
We know that communication is a messy, context-dependent affair. It is also one
at which we excel. The counterpart model helps us understand part of how context
comes into our discourse. Consider this case from Kripke (1977):
Suppose someone at a gathering, glancing in a certain direction, says
to his companion, “The man over there drinking champagne is happy
tonight.” Suppose both the speaker and hearer are under a false im-
pression, and that the man to whom they refer is a teetotaler, drinking
sparkling water. (256, example number omitted)
Kripke provides this example to draw out a difference between speaker reference and
semantic reference, which are relevant to evaluating whether the assertion is true. I
want to focus on a different matter: what makes this communication succeed.
Notice that the communication’s success does not depend on the truth or falsity
of what is said. The speaker could be understood even if the relevant man is miser-
able. Nor does the communication depend on both parties coming to the same truth
evaluation of the utterance: the hearer could understand the utterance and disagree.
The reason the communication succeeds is that the hearer is able to pick out the man
to which the speaker refers and predicate being happy tonight of him.
The counterpart model can help explain how the hearer manages to pick out the
right person. In the example, the false belief that the man’s glass contains champagne
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is contextually relevant. Because the champagne concepts in each party’s belief are
associated with ‘champagne’, they are counterparts in this context.
Suppose we change the example so that the hearer does not believe that the glass
contains champagne. Does this mean that communication will fail? Not necessarily.
Again, what’s important is that the hearer is able to pick out the right person. There
are a number of different ways this could happen besides sharing that false belief.
The speaker may, for example, indicate the drinker by nodding in his direction. In
this case, the hearer is able to pick out the right person by this non-linguistic move.
The belief that the man is drinking champagne is bypassed entirely—it is not relevant
to the discourse. Since the concepts both parties associate with ‘champagne’ co-refer,
that is enough in this scenario for them to be counterparts.
Another possibility is that the hearer looks around the room and, despite knowing
that the drinker is a teetotaler, understands that that is the indicated man because he
is the only one who looks like he’s drinking champagne. Here the communication does
initially fail—the hearer lacks the relevant belief, and thus a counterpart champagne
concept. Because of this failure, he looks around the room. When he does, he shifts
the context slightly, and makes a different belief relevant: that the substance in the
glass looks like champagne. The first belief, that the substance is champagne, is no
longer relevant. The parties have counterparts because they share the belief about the
appearance, and associate the champagne concept occurring there with ‘champagne’
in the utterance.
Counterparts may also help solve Kripke’s (1979/2008) famous puzzle about belief.
Kripke presents two independently plausible principles about the relation between
language and belief and argues that they are incompatible. One is the disquotational
principle7:
7I am not considering the strong disquotational principle, which changes the conditional to a
biconditional. The model of thought I have been discussing suggests that this is false. Someone may
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For any sentence ppq of a language L, if an L speaker, on reflection,
sincerely assents to ppq, then he believes that p.
The other is the translation principle:
If a sentence of one language expresses a truth in that language, then
any translation of it into another language also expresses a truth in that
other language. (440)
To show that these principles are incompatible Kripke imagines the case of Pierre,
a monolingual French speaker, who hears about the beauty of London while living
in Paris. Pierre will sincerely and on reflection assent to French language assertions
that London is beautiful:
(10) Londres est jolie.
By the disquotational principle we would conclude that:
(11) Pierre croit que Londres est jolie.
By the translational principle we conclude that:
(12) Pierre believes that London is pretty.
Now, Kripke supposes, Pierre moves to London, but does not know that the city
he lives in is the one he calls ‘Londres’. He learns English from the locals without
translating to French, and learns that he lives in a place called ‘London’. Because his
neighborhood is unattractive, he would assent to:
(13) London is not pretty.
So, by strong disquotation, we conclude that:
fail to assent to a sentence of a language they understand even if they have a belief with the same
propositional content as the sentence. They may do so, for example, if the belief uses concepts they
do not associate with the words in the sentence.
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(14) Pierre believes that London is not pretty.
Though (14) does not contradict (12), there is a puzzle here. Through plausible
principles about belief reports, we are led to characterize Pierre as believing that
London is and is not pretty. This portrays Pierre’s beliefs in a way that does not
accurately capture what is going on in his mind.
Thinking in terms of counterparts can help explain why this happens. While
both (12) and (14) are true, whether or not they are apt characterizations of Pierre’s
beliefs depends on context. In describing Pierre’s beliefs we need to establish a coun-
terpart relation between the concepts in Pierre’s relevant belief(s) and the concepts
our audience uses to understand our description. For (12) to be apt, for example,
the concept referring to London in Pierre’s belief that London is pretty needs to be
a counterpart to the concept our audience associates with ‘London’ in the context of
communication.
So, (12) may be apt if, say, we want to explain why Pierre has a painting of the
Palace of Westminster. A contextually relevant belief, individuated by propositional
content, is that the painting depicts London. Our audience believes this, as does
Pierre (using the concept he associates with ‘Londres ’), and so the word they (our
audience) associate with ‘London’ is a counterpart to the concept referring to London
in Pierre’s belief that London is pretty.
By contrast, (12) would be inapt if we were reporting on Pierre’s beliefs to his
neighbors in London. A contextually relevant belief in these contexts would probably
include one with the content Pierre lives in London. But Pierre’s London concept
in his belief about where he lives is distinct from the London concept in his belief
that London is pretty. So, to an audience that believes Pierre lives in London in a
context where that belief matters, the concept they associate with ‘London’ is not a
counterpart to Pierre’s in the belief (12) describes. So, it is inapt.
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In the context of this chapter, where we know about Pierre’s mental states, the
belief that ‘Londres’ and ‘London’ co-refer is contextually relevant. So, our London
concept is not a counterpart with either of Pierre’s. That is why neither (12) nor (14)
seems apt, despite both being true.
What I hope I’ve shown is that the counterpart model is a useful way to think
about interpersonal concept relations. It gives us a way to “share concepts” without
sharing concepts, and so avoids the problems I raise for cross-personal concept iden-
tity, while still respecting the idea that there must be something in common between
people’s concepts if they are going to talk to one another. More than that, its appli-
cation in Kripke’s (1979/2008) Pierre case suggests that it may provide new inroads
to some old puzzles about the relation between language and belief.
Conclusion
My main purpose in this chapter has been to erode support for the shareability
thesis. I argued that the truth of intentional generalizations does not give us reason
to think that concepts are shared, and that the success of linguistic communication
cannot depend on shared concepts.
This has important consequences for theories of concepts. It allows us to reconsider
theories that have been dismissed for rendering concepts unsharable. Prinz (2002),
for example, dismisses atomism on these grounds. Atomism holds that concepts are
unstructured mental objects that are individuated by their formal features. Prinz
argues that there is no way to understand what a formal feature is such that it both
accounts for Frege cases, and allows for multiple people to (commonly) have the same
concepts (2002, 96-8). If I am right, then there is no reason to do both.
Not all theories that have been dismissed for violating the shareability constraint
are vindicated. Fodor and Lepore’s (1992) arguments against semantic holism still
hold. They argue that semantic holism renders content unshareable (or at least very
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unlikely to be shared). As I have stressed throughout, we need to distinguish sharing
concepts from sharing content. The truth of intentional generalizations requires the
latter, as does the counterpart model of concepts’ role in communication. Shared
content has an important role to play in understanding human behavior; shared
concepts do not.
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CHAPTER 4
MENTAL BOOKKEEPING: SYMBOL TYPES IN THE
LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT
The topic of this chapter is mental bookkeeping. It sounds rather dry, admittedly,
but bookkeeping is central to LOT. For example, as we have seen in previous chapters
LOT explains Frege puzzles by positing bookkeeping errors—having multiple distinct
symbols that refer to the same thing. Or, more centrally, intentional laws are supposed
to be underwritten by laws that hold between symbols; so, the fact that such laws
exist depends on the mind’s ability to keep track of its symbolic vocabulary. I offer
an account of how the mind recognizes and distinguishes its basic symbolic elements.
More specifically, I develop an account of what sorts of properties lexical elements in
the language of thought need to share in order to count as symbols of the same type.
LOT symbol types are often described by analogy to orthographic types in written
language. If mentalese (the language of thought itself) were English, for example,
LOT would say that the mind distinguishes thoughts about dogs from those about
cats by distinguishing ‘dogs’ from ‘cats’. The analog to orthographic properties are
the “formal features” of mental symbols—some or other non-semantic properties these
symbols possess. The goal of this chapter is to discharge this analogy, and say what
formal features are and, by extension, how symbol types are individuated in the mind.
On my view, symbol types are physical types. Formal features are physical prop-
erties that mental processors can detect and distinguish, and symbol types are sets
of such properties. Call this the physical properties hypothesis (PPH). I argue that it
offers a simple explanation of what it is to be a mental symbol of a certain type, and
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explains how formal features play their distinctive role in LOT: allowing mental pro-
cessors to follow rules defined over symbol types without the need for interpretation.
In what follows, I set out the view and consider two arguments against it: one
from Pessin (1995), who argues that PPH undermines the systematicity of thought,
and another that stems from an analogy to written orthography, where the physical
diversity of symbol types makes PPH looks particularly implausible. Neither argu-
ment succeeds. Pessin’s worry stems from an overly narrow conception of physical
types, and the orthographic worry ignores a crucial difference between written lan-
guages and computational languages: that the former are compiled, and the latter
are not. I then consider an alternative proposal, Schneider’s (2011) view that symbols
are individuated by computational role. I argue that there can’t be the sort of roles
Schneider appeals to unless something like PPH is true, and that her view legislates
where PPH explains. At the very least, then, PPH deserves serious consideration in
the literature.
4.1 The explanatory target
I want to offer a theory of what symbol types are in the language of thought.
The sparse literature on this topic supplies three general strategies. One, which I will
defend in the following section, is to say that LOT symbol types are individuated by
the local features of symbols—the sorts of properties that a symbol can instantiate
in isolation (having a certain shape, for example). Another, which Pessin (1995)
discusses, is to say that formal features are semantic features. As discussed in previous
chapters, this is a non-starter (this is the moral of Frege cases). The third, which
Schneider (2009, 2011) endorses, is to identify formal features with role. The model
for this is logical vocabulary. It seems that we can individuate the logical elements
in a formal language by giving a truth table—a specification of their role. Perhaps,
the thought goes, all elements in a formal language can be individuated in this way.
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The role strategy is untenable, as I shall argue in §4.3 ff. It is tempting, however,
because it is easy to lose sight of what we mean by “symbol types.” The phrase can
refer to many different sorts of linguistic elements, at various levels of abstraction.
And once we fix the reference, there is still room for confusion on what a “theory”
of them is supposed to do. To avoid confusion, I want to begin by introducing some
distinctions.
The target here is not what I will call “grammatical types”: linguistic elements
like lexical category (e.g., noun, verb), grammatical class (e.g., sortal noun, mass
noun), functional category (e.g., agent, patient), or grammatical relation (e.g., sub-
ject, indirect object).1 Grammatical types are likely individuated by syntactic roles.
If so, what makes ‘Venus’ the subject of ‘Venus is uninhabitable’ is that it is play-
ing a certain sort of role in the sentence—a role defined by the language’s rules of
composition.
Again, I am not trying to offer a theory of what grammatical types are, or what
makes a symbol fall under a grammatical category.
What I am interested in is what distinguishes the things that fall under a category.
‘Venus’ and ‘Hesperus’ are both nouns, both names, etc. Yet they are distinct types
of symbols. For clarity, let’s say they are different lexical types.
Lexical types are the sorts of things that are supposed to be distinguished by
symbols’ formal features. (‘Symbol’ refers to a particular token instance of a lexical
type.) In LOT, symbols with the same formal features are the same lexical type.
Formally distinct symbols are different lexical types.
This is not true of grammatical types. Symbols with the same formal features can
be different grammatical types, and symbols with different formal features can be
the same grammatical type. Supposing for a moment that formal features are ortho-
1Category examples from Bickford and Daly (1996, F4, p. 2).
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graphic features2, ‘Venus’ in ‘Venus is uninhabitable’ is the subject of the sentence,
while a formally indiscernible symbol is the object of ‘Callippus observed Venus’.
And, of course, ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Venus’ are formally distinct though they both fall
under the same grammatical type of proper nouns.
The target of this chapter is to say how lexical types are distinguished in the
language of thought, and what makes a symbol fall under a certain lexical type. Or,
since lexical types are individuated by their formal features, the goal is to say what
formal features are.
Again, this is dry. But it is important. The ability to recognize and distinguish
lexical types is central to the mind’s ability to follow formally defined rules.
Suppose I believe:
1. Venus is uninhabitable.
2. Venus orbits the Sun between Mercury and Earth.
3. Mars orbits the Sun between Earth and Jupiter.
According to LOT, these beliefs exist in my mind as sentence-like structures in a
computational language. A constituent part of (1) is a symbol referring to the planet
Venus. Let’s name that particular symbol token ‘Venus1’. The second belief on the
list also contains a symbol referring to Venus. Call it ‘Venus2’. Suppose that on
the basis of these two beliefs, I infer that there is an uninhabitable planet orbiting
the Sun between Mercury and Earth. That means that my mind recognizes that the
Venus symbol in the second belief is the same type of symbol as the one in the first
belief. So, there is some lexical type—call it ‘〈VENUS〉’—of which Venus1 and Venus2
are tokens. I do not infer that there is an uninhabitable planet between Earth and
Jupiter on the basis of these beliefs. That means the symbol referring to Mars in (3)
2They are not. See §4.2 for why the common analogy between formal features and orthography
is inapt.
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(call it ‘Mars1’) is of a different type than these other two (call that type ‘〈MARS〉’).
〈VENUS〉 and 〈MARS〉 are, however, both members of the same grammatical type.
My mental rules of composition would treat them both as valid substitutions for x in
constructing a belief of the form 〈x IS UNINHABITABLE〉.
In addition to their being the same lexical type, Venus1 and Venus2 must be
recognizable as such to my mind. According to LOT, mental operations are governed
by formally defined rules. For example, suppose my mind follows modus ponens, which
says to infer Q if (P and if P, then Q). ‘P ’ and ‘Q ’ range over symbol categories (or
syntactic categories). Following this rule requires recognizing consistent substitutions
for these category variables. My mind needs to be able to recognize when the same
symbol type occupies both ‘P ’ variable places. If Venus1 and Venus2 were the same
type, but my mind could not recognize this, then we could get a consistent substitution
for ‘P’ (e.g. 〈if Venus1 is uninhabitable, then it isn’t worth exploring.〉&〈Venus2 is
uninhabitable〉), but the inference would not go through. So, the formal rule would
fail to govern my mind’s operation.
Indeed, if LOT’s explanation of thought as formal rule following is going to work,
the mind must be guaranteed to treat symbols of the same lexical type as such and
to be able to treat distinct types differently. Formal rules range over all possible
consistent substitutions for their variables. A system doesn’t count as following modus
ponens if it would systematically fail to derive Q on the basis of P and (if P, then Q)
for certain values of P. (There could, of course, be flukes: if the system is run over by
a steamroller mid computation, that would not count against its following the rule.
Hence, only the presence of systematic exceptions undermines the rule.) Likewise, if
a system were unable to treat symbols of different lexical types as such, then a formal
rule like modus ponens could not describe its operations. The rule it actually follows
allows a mismatch of symbol types in at least that one instance.
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This is not just an epistemic problem of figuring out which rules describe the
mind’s operations. The possibility of a systematic failure to recognize symbols of the
same lexical type as such would mean that no formal rule could truly describe its
operation (there would always be the exception). Which means that it would not be
following formal rules.
This entails that the features individuating lexical types must be, at a minimum,
co-extensive with the features that allow the mind to recognize symbol types. If the
mind—or more precisely, mental processors—could not recognize a difference between
distinct lexical types, then it would not be able to treat them differently. And, if
they could fail to recognize type identical symbols as such, then they would not be
guaranteed to be treated as the same type.
So, formal features must be processor-detectable properties of some sort. Formal
features mark symbols as being the same or different type in a way that the processor
can recognize. If they don’t do this, then formal rule following just doesn’t get started.
The goal of a theory of mentalese symbol individuation, then, is to say what sorts
of properties these are, and how symbol types are defined over them.
4.2 The physical properties hypothesis
I would like to defend a quasi-reductive account, which I earlier called the phys-
ical properties hypothesis (PPH). Formal features, on this view, are certain neu-
ral/physical properties of symbols, and lexical types are sets of such properties. This
is a quasi -reduction because while it identifies lexical types with something physical in
a sense, properties—even physical properties—are still abstract. Particular symbols
are concrete particulars, and they count as tokens of a certain type if they instantiate
all the properties that define that type, but the types themselves are still abstract
sets of properties.
85
While all of a symbol’s formal features are physical properties, for reasons I will
make clear in the next section, not all of a symbol’s physical properties are formal
features. Only certain processor detectable properties are. These are properties that,
if they differ between symbols, make it possible for a processor to treat these symbols
as inconsistent substitutions in a formal scheme (or as different elements in a logical
vocabulary).
Identifying lexical types with sets of processor detectable physical properties im-
plies a very fine-grained system of symbol individuation. Being an F-type symbol,
according to PPH, is a property defined relative to a particular mental processor. It
is a certain set of physical properties that symbols in a processor’s lexicon can have,
such that if two symbols share them, it cannot detect any difference between them.
This means that while multiple people can (and surely do) share grammatical types
(e.g., subject, object; noun, verb; etc.), their lexicons may contain none of the same
lexical types. Indeed, within a mind, different modules with their own processors may
have no lexical types in common.
So, for example, while you and I may both have a symbol for Venus (that is, a
symbol referring to Venus), there is likely no such thing as the symbol for Venus. It
would be something of an accident if there were. This consequence of PPH coheres
with the lessons from chapter 3 about sharing concepts. The possibility of Frege cases
means that we should not expect there to be univocal lexical types. Assuming there
was such a thing as the Venus symbol is exactly what led to the logical problems for
shared concepts accounts. We want it to be possible for you to have a symbol that
“looks like”3 ‘Venus’, and for me to have one that looks like ‘Phosphorus’ and for
these to be different types of symbols. That is—it would be possible for my mind to
systematically treat a symbol that looked like ‘Venus’ differently from one that looked
3I am using “looks like” here as a stand-in for instantiating a particular set of physical properties.
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like ‘Phosphorus’ and vice versa. PPH achieves this by providing an account which
says a particular set of processor detectable physical properties is a/the Venus symbol
for a particular processor. Whether or not symbols in different minds or modules
count as counterparts depends on what criteria are relevant for the comparison. But
the notion of “same symbol” is only defined relative to a single computational system.
The same is true for logical vocabulary. This is worth noting since logical vocab-
ulary is typically thought to be defined by role. So we might think that to be the
conjunction symbol is to play a certain role in a system. But we need to be careful. A
theory of lexical types attempts to offer the individuating conditions of symbols, not
the constitutive conditions on being a symbol of a certain grammatical or semantic
type.
While individuating conditions and constitutive conditions can sometimes align,
they need not. What it is to be a first baseman, for example, is to play a certain
role on a team. But how first basemen are individuated—how you tell them apart
from one another and from other players—is a matter of what they look like (e.g.,
the colors of their uniform and the name and number on the back).4
Likewise, what it is to be a conjunction symbol may well be to play a particular
role. So, what makes ‘&’ a conjunction symbol in some system is that it plays that
role. By contrast, what individuates the ‘&’ symbol, according to PPH, is that it
looks like ‘&’.
In a different system, a ‘∧’ may play the same role. Are they the same lexical type?
According to PPH there is no answer to that, simpliciter. The question would need
to be whether they are the same lexical type within a given system. And the answer
would depend on whether that system’s processor could recognize a difference between
something that looked like ‘∧’ and something that looked like ‘&’. They would be the
4Thanks to Louise Antony for the example.
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same type of symbol iff it were impossible (barring architectural changes) for it to
systematically treat ‘P & Q’ differently from ‘P ∧ Q’. This would be a rather strange
circumstance. There is nothing mandating that a symbol that looks like ‘&’ must be
a conjunction symbol, nor one that looks like ‘∧’. So, unless the difference between
them is invisible to a processor, it will be possible for it to co-opt those symbols for
distinct roles.5
All of this falls out of the fact that while we often talk about symbol types by
reference to content (or logical role), that cannot be how symbols themselves are
individuated—of what marks a symbol as being of a certain lexical type. Lexical
types are the bottom-level distinction that processors can make. And they must be
guaranteed to treat symbols of the same lexical type as such. The fact that a certain
symbol plays a particular role or has a particular meaning does not mean that it
must. So, having meaning or role in common is not sufficient for two symbols to be
the same type of symbol.
This is not to say that the semantics of logical vocabulary could not be fixed
by role. Very likely, what it is to be a symbol for conjunction is to play a certain
role, or be described by a certain truth table. Rather, the claim is that role does
not tell us how a particular lexical type of symbol that does stand for conjunction
is individuated—how a system recognizes its instances, and distinguishes them from
other items in its lexicon.
I linger on this point to make clear just what identity claim PPH is making. It
is not saying that, for example, to be a conjunction symbol is to be a physical type.
“Conjunction symbol” picks out a category that subsumes a variety of different lexical
types. If it is defined by playing a certain sort of role, any symbol type that plays this
5This leads to an interesting possibility. If a computational system could have two distinct
symbols playing the same logical role, there could be Frege cases for logical vocabulary. Such a
system might, for example, believe ¬P and not-Q (two different lexical symbols for not), but fail to
infer either ¬(P or Q) or not-(P or Q).
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role counts as a conjunction symbol. Since, according to PPH, lexical types are sets
of physical properties, the “conjunction type” of symbol is therefore multiply realized
by a number of different physical types. Likewise for the Venus symbol (if any sense
can be made of that category).
Again, we need something finer grained in order to make LOT work. It must be
the case that different types of symbols can have the same content, or else we lose the
ability to explain Frege cases. The fact that the same distinction between semantic
types and lexical types would apply to logical vocabulary is perhaps not necessary to
LOT, but neither is it a problem.
PPH claims that lexical types are physical types. To be a symbol of a certain lexical
type within a system is to instantiate certain physical properties—those detectable by
that system’s mental processors—which all other symbols of that type also instantiate.
Pessin’s argument against PPH
LOT claims that thought exhibits systematicity. That is, the ability to think
certain thoughts entails the ability to think certain other thoughts. For example,
someone who can think that John loves Mary can think that Mary loves John. This,
LOT says, is because these thoughts employ the same lexical elements and the same
rules of composition.
Pessin (1995) argues that PPH is incompatible with the systematicity of thought.
His argument goes roughly like this: Within a mind, either the thoughts that John
loves Mary and Mary loves John are physically distinct, or they are not. If not, then,
either the mental does not supervene on the physical (in which case, why bother with
the reduction?), or contra possibility the thought that John loves Mary just is the
thought that Mary loves John. So, there must be some physical difference between
them. This physical difference, Pessin reasons, must be a difference between the
symbols that occur in each thought. There must be some physical difference that
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marks the Mary symbol as the object in the first thought and the subject in the
second, he says. But that means that the symbols standing for Mary in each thought
are distinct physical types from one another. And if symbol types just are physical
types, that means there are two different types of Mary symbols. Which means that
the thoughts don’t use the same lexical elements after all. Which means that the
ability to think one does not necessitate the ability to think the other. Which means
we don’t get systematicity (1995, p. 36-7).
Pessin’s argument seems to hinge on the idea that we cannot physically realize
symbols and syntax. But this can’t be right. Symbols and syntax can, of course, be
physically realized, and they can be realized in different ways. If they couldn’t, then
there wouldn’t be computers.
The paradigm here is that of formal languages in logic. The recursive rules of
a productive and compositional language specify how new, syntactically distinct el-
ements can be formed using the same lexical elements. The lexicon specifies what
elements there are, and different lexicons delineate different grammatical categories.
The rules specify how elements from the various categories can be combined. So a
system might follow a rule allowing it to combine two-place propositions with any two
names like so: <proposition><name><name>. If ‘F’ is an element of the propo-
sitional lexicon, and ‘a’ and ‘b’ are elements of the name lexicon, this system can
generate the syntactically distinct formulas ‘Faa’, ‘Fab’, ‘Fba’, and ‘Fbb’. There are
certain physical features that allow a system following this rule to recognize the ‘a’
elements as the same lexical type, and a different set of physical features that allow
it to recognize its syntax. It makes one set of distinctions on the basis of its rules,
and the other on differences in the lexicon.
So, to Pessin’s case, while there must be physical differences between the thoughts
that John loves Mary and that Mary loves John, it needn’t be a difference between
the symbols—it could be a physical difference in syntax.
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Pessin’s error might be due to thinking that all of a symbol’s physical properties
are individuative of it as a symbol type. If that were true, then the formulas ‘Fab’
and ‘Fba’ would contain different symbols because ‘a’ in ‘Fab’ bears different physical
relations to ‘F’ and ‘b’ than the ‘a’ in ‘Fba’. But while one could individuate lexical
types in this way, there is no reason one should. Some of a symbol’s physical properties
mark it as being a certain lexical type, others mark it for syntax, and others still are
irrelevant to the computational system.
One might object that this renders PPH circular in the following way: PPH says
that lexical types are sets of physical properties. Which physical properties? Well,
not all of them (the exact number of atoms a symbol contains, perhaps). And not
even all of the ones that are relevant to the computation (there are some that mark
syntax). Just those that individuate lexical types.
To avoid this, what we want is a principled difference between the physical prop-
erties that individuate lexical types, and those that are still relevant to the com-
putation, but not individuative. Here’s one: the difference between relational and
non-relational properties. What makes a symbol token the type of symbol it is would
be its non-relational (with respect to other elements of the system), processor de-
tectable, physical properties. What makes a symbol token a subject or object of a
sentence depends on certain relations it bears to other elements in the system.
Pessin dismisses this possibility, stating:
[I]f the neural state corresponding to “John” is instantiated at the
same time as that corresponding to “Mary,” how could some other neural
state dictate the symbol “John”’s grammatical role? It would seem you’d
have to mark that symbol somehow; but while in English we mark the
symbol by its location in the sentence, that option just isn’t plausibly
available where the tokened symbol is identical to a neural state. (1995,
37)
But why shouldn’t there be something analogous to word order to mark a symbol’s
syntax? Term order works just fine for other physically realized formal languages.
And if not term order, there are plenty of other physically realizable properties for
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marking syntax (e.g., adding an -s or -o to the end of the symbol). Again, the pudding
proof is that computers actually do this stuff.
This passage indicates the second possible source of Pessin’s error. He seems to be
implying that the only neurally realizable syntactic property is concatenation. The
mental symbols ‘Mary’, ‘John’, and ‘loves’, qua neural states, he assumes, can bear
the co-instantiation relation to one another, but nothing else. If that were true, then
mental logic would be reduced to saying Mary & John & loves, and we would be in
a bind.
There is, of course, no reason to think that the only computationally relevant
relation between neural states is co-instantiation. The same lexical type of symbol
could be instantiated in different brain regions, or at different times, or in different
proximities to other symbolic elements.
Here’s a toy example. Suppose that ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘C’ name physical regions of
a computational system. These act as “memory registers.” Each consists of two
“bits”—two physical switches that hold electrical charge. Let’s say a bit is in state
‘1’ when the charge is above some threshold, and ‘0’ when below. The table below
represents a possible, synchronic physical state of the system.
A B C
0 0 0 0 0 0
In this example, every bit in every register is in state 0. The contents of each
register, then, instantiate the same type of physical state: having two bits in state 0
(or, each is in state 00). In this system, lexical types are the different physical types of
register contents (being in state 00, being in state 01, etc.). Suppose that a symbol’s
syntax is marked by which register it occupies. The values of register A, whatever
they are, are grammatical subjects, and those of register C are objects. So, both
lexical types and grammatical types are physically realized, but they are determined
by different physical properties.
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If 01 stands for Mary, 10 stands for John, and 11 stands for love, it will represent
the claim that John loves Mary like this:
A B C
1 0 1 1 0 1
And the claim that Mary loves John like this:
A B C
0 1 1 1 1 0
The same lexical types (qua physical types) occur in different ways within the system.
To be a token of the Mary symbol in this system is to be a register value of 01. This
occurs in one way in the first instance (instantiated by register C), and a different
way in the second (instantiated by A). The similarities are between lexical elements.
The differences mark syntactic differences.
It is clear how systematicity falls out of a system like this. Since all of the registers
can instantiate the same symbol types, then they can contain any combination of them
that its rules of operation allow. As long as the system has recursive rules that range
over grammatical categories, it will be able to follow those rules to construct both
variations of the sentence.
Moreover, we know that such a system would work because this is how computers
do work (well, roughly anyway).
Compiled vs non-compiled languages
The second objection to PPH I want to consider stems from the common analogy
between orthographic features of written symbols and formal features of computa-
tional symbols. While there do seem to be some similarities—orthographic features
are non-semantic, for example—there is good reason to think that orthographic sym-
bols should not be identified with any of the physical properties their tokens possess.
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This is because there might be no single set of physical features all symbols of a type
have in common.
We might think that what unifies orthographic types is something about the shape
properties of their symbols. But, on reflection, word symbols of the same type can
come in all sorts of shapes. In English, for example, ‘Venus’, ‘V enus’, and ‘VENUS ’
all count as tokens of the same type even though they are physically distinct. More
distinct still are the highly stylized symbols used in graffiti or calligraphy.
This looks bad for the physical properties hypothesis. If symbol tokens do not need
to share a core set of physical properties (shape properties, in this case), then types
of orthographic symbols could not be individuated by such properties. The worry,
then, is that PPH isn’t true for natural languages because there is no consistent set
of physical properties shared by symbols of the same orthographic type. So, if PPH
is to work for LOT, we need to have good reason to think that LOT is not subject
to this sort of variation.
We do. In fact, we have good reason to think that lexical types in LOT cannot be
subject to the same sort of physical variation as orthographic symbols in a written
language. This type of symbol variation is only possible for a compiled language.
And, while natural languages are compiled, LOT is not.
Compilers, in the computer science sense, are programs that have rules for trans-
forming statements in a human readable programming language into a machine read-
able language. The processor never “sees” expressions in the higher level language.
All it ever has to read or write are the expressions in its own language. For present
purposes, compilers perform two crucial functions: (1) they translate expressions, and
(2) they map discernibly different symbols of the same lexical type in the higher level
language onto indiscernible symbols in the processor’s language.
The translational function allows a computational system to execute commands
from various higher level languages. Without compilers, programmers would be lim-
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ited to a single computational language for each type of computational architecture—
machine language. Compilers, then, allow a processor to (indirectly) use a variety of
languages.
Compilers also allow symbol variation within languages. For example, the pro-
gramming language BASIC is a case-insensitive language. The command ‘goto’ in
BASIC is exactly the same as ‘GOTO ’—they are just different ways of writing the
same symbol. This is not the case for a language like C, which treats upper- and
lowercase letters as different alphabets. Writing a ‘goto’ command in C will not
generate the same result as a ‘GOTO ’ command. This is a difference in how these
languages are compiled. BASIC compilers translate both ‘GOTO ’ and ‘goto’ into
the same element in the machine language. A BASIC compiler hides the differences
from the processor. Whether or not the symbol is written in upper- or lowercase in
BASIC, the compiler ensures that the processor sees exactly the same symbol (or
symbolic function). While there is variation in the higher level language, there is no
corresponding variation in the language the processor actually uses. The C compiler,
by contrast, encodes the difference in the higher level language into a difference in
the lower level language.
The reason, then, that there can be discernible symbols of the same type in a
higher level language is because the compiler maps them on to the same symbol type
in the processor language. And here’s the catch: Since the symbols of a processor lan-
guage are not compiled onto lower level languages—these are the bedrock languages
of computation—there is no lower level of symbol typing to unite discernibly distinct
processor symbols.
This is the difference between orthographic types and formal types in LOT. Our
minds are compilers for natural language expressions. They take things written or
said in a high level language (a natural language), and transform them into a lower
level language, the language of thought, which our mental processors can read. LOT
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is at the bottom of this process. There is no sub-language of thought. If there were,
then that would be the language of thought. LOT is whatever is at the bottom; it
can’t be turtles all the way down.
We can understand the compilation process for orthographic expressions as having
two components. One is a process of symbol recognition—of categorizing a visual
input as being a symbol of a certain type. The other is symbol comprehension where
that representation of symbol type is associated with our concepts for the symbol’s
content. So, we see ‘Venus’, recognize it as a ‘Venus’ type symbol, and associate it
with a concept referring to Venus.
What concerns us here is the recognition aspect. Word recognition has been stud-
ied extensively in cognitive science.6 The general picture is that our brain transforms
a visual input into a representation of its physical features, matches those physical
features to stored representations of abstract letter identities, and matches that pat-
tern of letters to representations of orthographic types in our orthographic lexicon.
So, recognizing ‘Venus’ is a matter of representing the markings out there in the
world as containing ‘v’, ‘e’, ‘n’, ‘u’, ‘s’, in that order, and associating that pattern of
representations with our stored representation of the ‘Venus’ symbol type.
Our letter recognition system can match many different physical patterns to the
same mental representation of letter type. We see an ‘e’ on the page, and the system
says “that matches very nicely with the shape pattern I associate with the letter
e—let’s say that’s an e.” We see a colorful, flowing design sprayed on the dumpster
out back, and the system says “hmmm, I think these are letters... the best match
for this symbol is with the pattern I associate with the letter e—so e it is.” This
ability to recognize a variety of patterns as instances of the same letter type in turn
6See Rastle (2007) for an overview.
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allows a combinatorial explosion of associations between physical patterns and mental
representations of orthographic types.
If tokens of orthographic types don’t need to have physical shapes in common,
what makes them count as instances of the same type? We do. It’s the fact that
we represent them as containing the letters they do that makes them the same type.
Orthographic symbols, therefore, depend not on their physical properties for their
identity, but rather on their relation to the minds of the symbol using community.
What makes the varying written instances of ‘Venus’ instances of the ‘Venus’ type
is that we associate them with mental representations referring to that orthographic
type. That is, to be ‘Venus’ is to be thought of as ‘Venus’.
Our mental processors ignore the physical differences between type identical sym-
bol tokens in a compiled language because they never actually see them. The inputs
‘Venus’ and ‘VENUS’ are mapped onto the same representation by the compiler, and
the processor only ever sees that output representation. (We see the differences, but,
of course, we are more than just language compilers.) So, a processor reading a com-
piled language is guaranteed to treat physically distinct, but type identical, symbols
in the same way because the rules of its compiler ensure there is no difference for it
to see.
Nothing like this is available to symbol types in an uninterpreted language. If sym-
bols are distinct in ways a processor can detect, then there is no reason it must treat
them as the same. So, for an uninterpreted language, whatever processor detectable
features a symbol token possesses must be shared by all other tokens of that lexical
type. So, at the very least the property of having that set of features is co-extensive
with the property of being a symbol of that type.
This paints a picture very amenable to the physical properties hypothesis. If
processor detectable features are just physical features, and if tokens of the same
lexical type must possess the same set of processor detectable features, then we have
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a a stable physical type for reduction. No other features need to enter into symbol
individuation.
The more general upshot is that if PPH is true, we know how the mind recognizes
tokens of the same type: because it recognizes physical features, and there are literally
no (non-relational) physical differences between the symbols that it can see. And we
know why it is guaranteed to be able to distinguish distinct symbol types: because
they are physically distinct in exactly the ways that a processor can recognize.
We have good reason, then, to take PPH seriously. Contra Pessin, it does not
preclude the systematicity of thought, and, because LOT is not a compiled language,
it will exhibit just the sort of symbol uniformity PPH needs.
4.3 Schneider’s “total computational role” account
Schneider (2011) advances a competitor to PPH. She argues that lexical types are
causal/computational roles. That is, to be a symbol of a certain lexical type, on her
view, is to play a certain causal role.
More specifically, she says that mental symbols are defined by Ramsifying the
rules that describe the mind’s operations (2011, 120-3). Ramsification is a method of
defining a term by conjoining all of the claims a theory makes about it, replacing the
term with a variable, and saying that what the term means is the role played by the
variable in the sentence.
Casting the account in terms of Ramsey sentences immediately leads to problems.
Ramsification is a process of semantic definition, not symbol individuation. It tells
you what a certain term means by the role it plays in the meaningful claims of a
theory. If you want to know what an electron is, for example, you yank ‘electron’ out
of all the meaningful claims physics makes about electrons, put in an x, and say that
an electron =df the thing that does all the theory says x does. This would not tell
you what symbol physicists use to mean electron; it tells you what ‘electron’ means.
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Sometimes it seems that this is what Schneider has in mind. In one passage,
she states the account by saying that “[a] symbol is defined by the role it plays in
the algorithm that describes the central system” (2011, 121, emphasis mine). If she
were offering an account of how symbols are defined—that is, what their semantic
content is—she could use Ramsey sentences as she does. (Though it would be a
wildly implausible account.) But this is not her project. Instead, she claims she is
offering a non-semantic theory that identifies the sorts of things that can serve as neo-
Fregean modes of presentation (133). That is, of symbols as formally individuated
objects—what I have been calling lexical types.
Let’s suppose that there is some sense to be made of Ramsification as a method
for lexical symbol individuation. If we are going to evaluate Schneider’s account, we
need to know what sorts of roles are supposed to individuate lexical types. That is, we
need to know just what is being Ramsified. Unfortunately, Schneider is rather elusive
on this point. She initially states that the sentence ranges over “all the algorithms
that a final cognitive science employs to describe the workings of the central system”
(121-2). This suggests that we are looking at a fairly abstract rule set. Describing
the workings of central cognition algorithmically would be akin to describing the
construction and derivation rules of a formal logic system.
The problem with this interpretation is that these algorithms are cast in terms
of grammatical types, not lexical types. They tell you that you can combine a noun
phrase with a verb phrase, or that you can derive some proposition Q from P and if
P, then Q. At best, this would give us a distinction between elements in the logical
vocabulary, and would tell us that the language contains things like nouns, verbs,
subjects, objects, names, etc. It could not give us a distinction between elements
in the non-logical lexical elements: the rules for handling the ‘Hesperus’ symbol are
exactly the same as those for the ‘Phosphorus’ symbol.
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The example Schneider gives of a Ramsey sentence suggests that she intends
something else: that the Ramsey sentence range over the actual causal profile of
a particular mind. The sentences conjoined in the Ramsey sentence would specify
input/output relations between mental states. Here is her example:
x has [〈beer〉] =df ∃P∃Q (input [{ }] causes P, and P causes both Q
and output [{ }], and x is in P)
Where P is the predicate variable replacing “has [〈beer〉]” in the the-
ory, and Q refers to a different primitive symbolic state. (122, some or-
thographic substitutions made due to formatting constraints)
I think this example gets the idea across, even if the particulars are a little confusing
(e.g., the sentence does not say which variable defines 〈beer〉, and it is unclear why
‘has 〈beer〉’ would be in the sentence and not just ‘〈beer〉’). Instead of taking the
algorithms that describe the central system, we describe a particular mind’s inferential
dispositions for all possible inputs, and Ramsify over those. This would generate
distinctions between lexical types. Different lexical types of symbols are likely to take
part in different inferences. An instance of 〈beer〉 in one place would probably cause
a different output (or mediating state) than 〈water〉 in the same place.
This, then, is the best candidate for Schneider. Unfortunately, as we shall see, it
cannot work.
Processors cannot respond to roles
Processors need to recognize and distinguish lexical types. They need to be able
to look at a symbol in an input string and compare it to items in memory, and in
explicitly represented rules. Suppose I follow a rule that says to shush my cat if it is
meowing and I already fed it. It might be represented like this:
If input is 〈cat meowing〉, then if 〈fed the cat〉 is stored in memory,
output 〈shush cat〉, otherwise output 〈feed cat〉.
To make this work, my mental processor needs to recognize that the 〈cat〉 symbol in
the input is the same lexical type as the symbol in my memory that says 〈fed the
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cat〉. If lexical types are roles, it is unclear how my mental processor could make this
comparison. Being the same type of symbol is not a locally detectable feature, on this
view. To recognize that two symbols are of the same lexical type requires stepping
outside the system and seeing if they play the same role.
But even this is a perplexing idea. Symbols—that is, token representational
vehicles—do not have roles. Roles describe patterns that hold of a symbol type.
It is not as if one and the same symbol token occurs in all the places where x occurs
in the Ramsey sentence (indeed, this would put us perilously close to Pessin’s worry
that there is no difference between the thoughts that John loves Mary and Mary loves
John). Rather, the same type of symbol occurs in all those places. So, it wouldn’t
even be possible to take an external look at a system and see whether two symbols
are the same type. You would need to be told what types of roles there are and which
role those token symbols played. Let’s call the symbol that occurs in my input ‘cat1’
and the one stored in my memory ‘cat2’. If I want to figure out what my mental
processor is going to do when it sees 〈cat1 meowing〉 and 〈fed the cat2〉, it does no
good to know that there is a type of symbol such that if they were the same type they
would cause the output 〈shush cat〉. I need to know that cat1 and cat2 are instances
of that type of symbol.
This is, of course, moot because processors can’t take an external view to figure
out what role-type a symbol instantiates. If lexical types are role types, the processor
needs some way of encoding type identity—some way of marking symbols to indicate
what role they play. But then this mark would do all the work of formal features.
It would be the feature that a processor uses to recognize and distinguish symbol
types. Its rules would be defined over symbols typed by having that marker. So,
while symbol types certainly have roles, these roles cannot be what defines them.
You can’t know what role a symbol plays unless you know what type of symbol it is.
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So, Schneider’s account fails to explain how a processor can recognize symbols
as being tokens of the same type. It is worse, then, than any “detectable features”
account—that is, any account which identifies symbol types with sets of processor
detectable features. The physical properties hypothesis is one such view, claiming
that all the detectable features are physical properties.
TCR is ungrounded
There is a deeper problem about the individuation of roles themselves. There can’t
be any facts about what roles exist if there is no role-independent criteria for symbol
identity. If there is no fact about which symbol is which, then any way of carving up
roles is equally good. You cannot construct a Ramsey sentence in a principled way
without knowing which symbols the variable is supposed to replace.
Schneider (2011) is aware of a problem in this vicinity. She says that this is an
epistemological puzzle about symbol individuation, stating the worry as follows:
[T]o grasp which laws figure in the Ramsification that serves to type in-
dividuate the LOT primitives, we must borrow from an antecedent knowl-
edge of symbol types, one that we do not have prior to their definition, for
we must already know what the property types are to know which laws
figure in the Ramsification. (122)
Her response is that epistemology should not drive our metaphysics. A role (or
the property of playing a particular role) can exist even if there is no “epistemolog-
ical route” into discovering that role. An epistemological worry like this one, about
knowing the laws, does not tell us anything about the metaphysics of symbol indi-
viduation. So, since she is trying to offer just such a metaphysical theory, Schneider
claims the worry does not apply (123-4).
But there is a metaphysical problem here. Suppose I have two mental rules:
If input is 〈cat meowing〉, then if 〈fed the cat〉 is stored in memory,
output 〈shush cat〉, otherwise output 〈feed cat〉, and if input is 〈dog
barking〉, then if 〈fed the dog〉 is stored in memory, output 〈let dog
outside〉, otherwise output 〈feed dog〉.
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To distinguish between the orthographic properties used in text to distinguish sym-
bols, and that role properties that Schneider claims individuate mental symbols, let’s
say that all instances of ‘cat’ are C-type symbols. We could define a role like this:
C-type symbol =df the x such that input 〈x meowing〉 causes output
〈shush x〉 if 〈fed the x〉 is stored in memory, and output 〈feed x〉 otherwise,
and if input is 〈dog barking〉, then if 〈fed the dog〉 is stored in memory,
output 〈let dog outside〉, otherwise output 〈feed dog〉.
The problem, however, is that I simply stipulated that sentence describes a role.
Without stipulation or some prior criteria for lexical individuation, nothing makes it
true that this describes a role, but not a sentence that substituted x for some some
‘cat’ instances and some ‘dog’ instances, or any other haphazard substitution scheme.
For example:
C-type symbol =df the x such that input 〈x meowing〉 causes output
〈shush cat〉 if 〈fed the cat〉 is stored in memory, and output 〈feed x〉
otherwise, and if input is 〈dog barking〉, then if 〈fed the x〉 is stored in
memory, output 〈let x outside〉, otherwise output 〈feed dog〉.
This has just as much claim on being a genuine role as the first Ramsey sentence.
If there were some other principled way of individuating lexical types (like all ‘cat’
looking instances are the same lexical type), then we could point to a principled
difference between the two. But this way out is unavailable to Schneider. On her
view, what it is to be a lexical type is to play a particular role.
Unless role types are simply stipulated (as, for example, the rules of chess stipulate
what types of pieces there are), the facts about which symbol roles exist are grounded
by facts about what lexical types exist. And what grounds facts about what lexical
types exist would seem to be facts about what properties symbol tokens have in
common. But, if what symbol types have in common is just that they play a particular
role, then we have a tight circle, and there seems to be nothing about the world that
makes one type of role exist and not another.
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TCR leads to false equivocations
Perhaps there is some other principled difference between roles that exist and those
that don’t that relies neither on fiat nor prior criteria for symbol type individuation.
The onus is on the defender of role individuation to say what that would be. Even
if one were to be found, however, role based views still fair worse than detectable
features views. As I argued above, they cannot explain how processors recognize
symbol types, nor why they must treat type identical symbol tokens as the same.
They also provide counter-intuitive predictions about symbol identity—saying that
two token mental symbols are the same type when, in fact, they are not.
Suppose there is a vending machine that works like this: when you push the
button labeled ‘Soda’ it sends a signal to a computer, generating the input 〈SODA〉.
This input corresponds to a certain pattern of electrical activity in the computer’s
memory register. The computer has a rule that says if it detects 〈SODA〉 input it
should first check to see if there is any soda left in the soda slot (slot A), then, if
there is, dispense a soda by releasing the door to slot A. The rule is written like this:
Rule 1: 〈If input=SODA, then if EMPTY(SLOT A)=false,
DISPENSE(SLOT A), otherwise REFUND〉.
The output 〈DISPENSE(SLOT A)〉 sends a signal to slot A, causing it to release the
door. The result is that when you push ‘Soda’, you get a soda.
The machine also has a button labeled ‘Tea’. Tea is in slot B, and the internal
computer has the following rule:
Rule 2: 〈If input=TEA, then if EMPTY(SLOT B)=false,
DISPENSE(SLOT B), otherwise REFUND〉.
〈SODA〉 and 〈TEA〉 are different symbol types in this system. And Schneider’s view
captures this. The 〈TEA〉 input causes a different output than the 〈SODA〉 input.
We can define 〈SODA〉 in a Ramsey sentence like this:
〈SODA〉=df ıx such that:
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1. If input=x, then output=〈...SLOT A...〉, and
2. If input=〈TEA〉, then output=〈...SLOT B...〉
So far, so good. But now imagine the machine is mis-programmed. The person
writing the code for that particular vending machine makes a typo, inserting ‘A’
where ever there was supposed to be a ‘B’ in the rules. So instead of Rule 2, it has
this:
Rule 2*: 〈If input=TEA, then if EMPTY(SLOT A)=false,
DISPENSE(SLOT A), otherwise REFUND〉.
Now, if you push ‘soda’, you get a soda. But if you push ‘tea’, you also get a soda.
On Schneider’s view, this programming error reduces the number of symbol types
in the machine’s language. Remember, the labels ‘〈SODA〉’ and ‘〈TEA〉’ are cheats—
they stand for symbol types, which Schneider claims are roles. If she is right, then
because there is only one role (causing the machine to check slot A, and dispense a
soda from that slot), then there is only one symbol type.
The intuitive move here is to say that there are still two different types of symbols
because there are two different patterns of electrical activity in the machine’s memory
register depending on which button is pushed. But, if we go Schneider’s route, what
reason do we have for saying that these patterns are different types of states for the
machine? We are supposed to individuate symbolic states by their role, and the role
of each pattern is the same: causing slot A to dispense. The appealing move tacitly
individuates symbolic states by their physical properties.
We also cannot just bite the bullet, holding that machines following rules 1 and
2* have fewer symbol types than those following rules 1 and 2. Doing so causes us
to miss important counterfactual generalizations about those machines: if their rules
were different, the different electrical patterns in the register would generate different
outputs.
A better view would say that the machine still has two different symbol types,
but in the mis-programming case, it happens to treat them as the same. This is,
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of course, just what the physical properties hypothesis says. The two symbols are
physically distinct in a way the processor can detect.
Conclusion
The physical properties hypothesis provides a simple, yet powerful account of how
mental symbols are individuated. Even without knowing which particular physical
properties delineate symbol types, it gives us insight into how mental processors
recognize lexical types. They match and distinguish physical/neural properties of
symbols in their input, rules, and background knowledge. This suggests that the
next step towards a more complete LOT is finding what sorts of physical properties
these processors are sensitive to. And this, unlike the preceding, is a wholly empirical
question. Which is to say, it is someone else’s job.
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CHAPTER 5
A DEFENSE OF HYPER-REPRESENTATIONALISM
Content attribution is ubiquitous in psychology. Vision scientists, for example, in-
terpret states of the visual system as representing edges, developmental psychologists
attribute representations of causation to infants, and cognitive ethologists attribute
distance representations to certain species of ants. Yet many theorists are hesitant
to accept content realism, the view that having content is an objective feature of the
world. They hold that when we interpret a state as representing P (as having P
content), we are not committed to there being a property of having P content that
the state possesses independently of us and our theoretical goals. The aim of this
chapter is to show that this skepticism is unwarranted.
One reason for doubting the reality of content is that while content attribution is
undeniably useful, it is unclear exactly why. Perhaps, as Chomsky (1995) seems to
suggest, it merely plays a convenient expositional role, with content standing in for
some difficult-to-characterize feature of cognition. If so, content attribution would be
an eliminable part of our scientific understanding of the mind, at least in principle.
Or perhaps, as Egan (2014) argues, it plays the ineliminable role of showing how
a mathematically characterized device amounts to performing an intentionally char-
acterized cognitive capacity. This suggests that having content is not an objective
feature of the world, but rather a product of our theorizing.
Another reason to doubt the realist ontology is that we lack an (uncontroversial)
naturalistic theory of content determination. Egan (2014) claims that without a
naturalistic relation that explains how R determinately represents P, any need we
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have to attribute P -content to R must follow from something about us and our
theoretical goals, not the objective facts about the phenomena. So, having content,
on her view, is not an objective feature of the world.
Such doubts are misplaced. In what follows, I will argue that realism is not hostage
to a theory of content. Mental content is a theoretical posit in a science that attempts
to describe objective features of the world. We can, and should, be realists if we have
good empirical reasons for attributing content. That is, realism requires a naturalistic
basis for content attribution, not a naturalistic relation for content determination.
Looking at the empirical literature, I argue further that we have such a basis, and
that content attribution plays ineliminable roles that neither Chomsky (1995) nor
Egan (2014) can account for. I conclude by defending a particular realist view that
Egan (2014) terms “hyper-representationalism,” which claims mental representations
have their content essentially—that their content is part of what makes them the
type of representation they are.
5.1 Realism and eliminativism
The debate over the ontological status of mental content is a debate over what
properties mental representations must have to perform their explanatory role in
psychology. Both what mental representations are and what role they play are mat-
ters of considerable controversy. As relatively untendentious characterization, mental
representations are physically realized mental structures that can be interpreted as
representing (referring to, standing for, or being about) some feature of the world.
The physical state or symbol itself is what is called a representational vehicle. When
we talk about mental content, we are talking about what these vehicles represent.
Because they are physical objects, representational vehicles are responsible for
the causal (behavior producing) effects of mental representations. What, then, is
content good for? Realists argue that content plays some unique, non-causal, and
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theoretically important role in our explanations of behavior, and claim that this gives
us good reason to believe that having content is an objective feature of the world.
Eliminativists deny that content plays any theoretically important role, claiming that
content attribution can, in principle, be replaced with something else.
Let’s give some structure to this debate. Realism is typically defended along the
following general lines:
1. Some successful explanations and predictions in psychology attribute content
to mental representations. (Empirical premise)
2. Content attribution is an ineliminable part of these explanations/predictions.
(Ineliminability premise)
3. If content attribution is an ineliminable part of successful explanations, then
the mental representations they range over really have the content ascribed.
(Realist premise)
Elminativists challenge realists to justify the ineliminability premise. Realists
have obliged. Pylyshyn (1984), Block (1986), and Fodor (1995) argue that the laws
of psychology are supposed to generalize over a potentially heterogeneous class of
representational vehicles. If that were the case, then eliminating talk of content
would leave us with a disjunctive class of states with no account of what they have
in common.
In taking this line, realists are making an empirical bet that minds and mental
states subsumed under the laws of psychology are often homogeneous only at the level
of content. Fodor (1995), for example, writes that he can imagine a world in which:
the laws that a computational psychology implements might be in-
tractably and ineliminably intentional because they are laws about [...] a
kind of content heterogeneous minds can share in virtue of similarities in
their extrinsic relations. (53, emphasis original)
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But, he continues, he has no a priori argument showing that this is actually the case.
Our world may be one where psychological laws cover minds that are heterogeneous at
the syntactic level and homogeneous at the content level, but “whether it is, is strictly
an empirical issue” (53). This bet is backed by the claim that nothing in our current
understanding of the mind requires homogeneity at other levels of explanation. If
it turns out that minds are in fact homogeneous at some other level, it would be a
surprise, and something of an accident since our current understanding is compatible
with it not being the case.
For their part, eliminativists take the realists’ bet. They argue that psychologists’
talk of content does not express any deep theoretical commitment, but is a product of
an incomplete understanding of the mind and a need for convenient ways of referring
to complex states. Chomsky (1995), for example, argues that talk of content within
science is merely a convenient, informal shorthand for an internal specification of
a computational role. As an example, he considers Ullman’s (1979) computational
specification of the visual detection of motion. Though Ullman used a video of a
rotating cube to test his model and described subjects as representing the cube,
Chomsky contends that the theory itself was really about the internal relations of
symbols. It describes a mathematical relation between states. What they were about,
Chomsky claims, does not figure into the theory itself. So, he writes:
There is no meaningful question about the “content” of the internal
representations of a person seeing a cube under the conditions of the
experiments, or if the retina is stimulated by a rotating cube, or by a
video of a rotating cube... No notion like “content”, or “representation
of”, figures within the theory... (1995, 52).
What content attribution buys us, according to Chomsky, is a convenient way of
labeling mental states. On his view, psychologists use content in the way someone
teaching logic might use semantic interpretations of logical symbols. When an instruc-
tor provides an interpretation of their logical vocabulary—∀x becoming ‘everybody’,
∃x becoming ‘somebody’, and ∀x∃yLxy becoming ‘everybody loves somebody’, for
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example—this provides a quick, intuitive way to talk about the symbols. But the
subject matter of the lesson is not everybody, somebody, or love—it is the rules gov-
erning the symbolic relations. The interpretation is not part of the theory. Likewise,
on Chomsky’s view, when Ullman talks about the representation of a cube’s corner, it
is only to give a convenient name to a symbol; what matters is the symbol’s internal
role in the visual system.
It is not enough for eliminativists to show that any particular explanation might
do without content. They need to give some reason to think that every explanation
could, at least in principle, eliminate talk of content. Chomsky justifies this by using
a Twin Earth thought experiment in which a person, Jones, is replaced overnight by
his twin, J —a person whose internal states are exactly like Jones’, but have different
contents due to J’s living on a planet with distinct but perceptually indistinguishable
elements. Chomsky claims that Earth’s psychology will predict J’s behavior just as
well as it would have predicted Jones’. So, Chomsky claims, from the point of view
of working psychologists “little seems at stake in these debates” over content (1995,
53).
5.2 Egan’s anti-realism
Egan (2014) offers a distinct third alternative to both eliminativism and realism.
Unlike the eliminativist, she accepts the realist’s ineliminability premise. Our cogni-
tive theories often aim at explaining some competence or capacity, she claims, and
since these are described in intentional terms (the capacity to detect edges, for exam-
ple) we need to attribute content to cognitive mechanisms to show how it relates to
the phenomena being explained.
This is not a vindication of realism, she argues. Egan denies instead the realist
premise, arguing that the ineliminability of content from explanations in psychology
does not give us good reason to believe that mental representations really have the
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content ascribed to them. She views content as a product of explanation. On her
view, content is ineliminable in explanations of cognitive capacities, but there are no
objective, evaluator-independent facts about what content a representation has.
Egan’s (2014) position is that content attribution plays a heuristic role in psy-
chology. We ascribe content to make it clear to us how the operations of some com-
putational mechanism amount to performing a pre-theoretically characterized task.
Content ascription, she says, “secures the connection” between these mechanisms and
the capacity/competence that is the explanatory target (130). Since explanations are
for our benefit—they tell us, the theorists, how something works—Egan views content
ascription as a theoretical artifact, not to be understood as making a claim about
properties the mechanism possesses independently of us and our theoretical aims.
Had we characterized the capacity differently, or evoked the very same mechanism to
explain a different capacity, we might ascribe different content. Absent our theoretical
concerns, there simply is no fact of the matter about what content the states of some
mechanism have. Nonetheless, because psychology is in the business of giving expla-
nations of capacities, and explanations are, again, for our benefit, content ascription
is ineliminable from our explanations.
We can think of Egan’s (2014) views on what it is to have content along the lines
of what Dretske (1993) calls having an “assigned function.” He gives an example of
a precise, highly sensitive scale. A theorist can place a small item on the scale and
interpret its readout as giving the weight of the item. Or, since weight is a function of
height above sea level, a theorist could put something on the scale and treat the scale
as an altimeter. If the scale previously displayed ‘1g’ at sea level and now, weighing
the same object, displays ‘.98g’, the theorist could take that as meaning they are at
an altitude of 40,000ft above sea level (Dretske 1993, 301-2). What the display means
is a product of the function we assign to it. Dretske writes:
We get a new functional meaning because our altered background
knowledge (normally a result of different intentions and purposes) changes
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what the pointer’s behavior [means]. With assigned functions, the [mean-
ings] change as our purposes change. (1993, 302)1
So it is, Egan (2014) claims, with mental representations in psychology. Theorists
posit a mechanism to explain some cognitive capacity, and interpret its states in light
of how this capacity is characterized. Should the theorists change their intentions or
purpose they could, Egan (2014) contends, interpret the same mechanism differently,
and thereby change its states’ representational content.
5.3 What is content attribution good for, anyway?
To get clearer on Egan’s conception of content’s role in psychology, consider
the well studied example of the desert ant Cataglyphis ’s navigational capacities.
Cataglyphis is able to navigate back to its nest in a straight line after walking hun-
dreds of meters in a labyrinthine path to find food.2 Unlike other species of ants,
the desert ant cannot navigate by a pheromone trail. Instead, theorists argue that it
navigates (in part) by using a system of path integration.3 Path integration can be
modeled in a number of ways.4 Maurer and Seguinot (1995), for example, describe
one method like this (summarizing Wehner and Wehner’s (1990) model):
Let ϕn be the (recursively computed) compass direction from the start-
ing point to the animal; let ln be the (recursively computed) beeline dis-
tance between the starting point and the animal; let δ be the angle by
which the (n+1)th step deviates from ϕn, and hence ϕn+δ the direction,
1For ease of exposition I have omitted Dretske’s notation distinguishing what he calls functional
meaning from natural meaning.
2This discussion of desert ant navigation draws from Wehner and Srinivasan (1981), Wehner and
Wehner (1990), and Burge (2010).
3Path integration is also known as dead reckoning or vector navigation. In addition to path
integration, Cataglyphis also makes use of visual piloting, in which the ant uses a landmark map to
guide it through familiar territory, and systematic search, in which the ant uses an algorithm that
generates a spiral-based pattern for exploring new territory and returning to its search origin.
4See Maurer and Seguinot (1995) for an overview of various models, and a discussion of their
purposes, advantages, and disadvantages.
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as computed by the animal, in which it proceeds for another step (an-
gles are expressed in degrees; every step is of arbitrary length 1). Then
ϕn+1 and ln+1 denote the direction and distance, respectively, after the
(n+ 1)-th step:
ϕn+1 =
ln+ϕn+δ
ln+1
= ϕn·(ln+1)+δ
ln+1
ln+1 = ln + 1− δ90◦
The computational model consists in the mathematical equations at the bottom of
the passage. The explanation of how the ant finds its way home also includes Maurer
and Seguinot’s (1995) interpretation of the symbols as angles, directions, vectors, and
steps. Egan (2014) argues that this interpretation is purely for our benefit. Without
it, we would be unable to see how the model amounts to the capacity to find a straight
vector home. So, it is an ineliminable part of the explanation of the capacity. But,
she claims, this does not show that the ant really represents these things—that, as
a matter of objective, evaluator-neutral fact, its states have these contents. What is
objectively true is that the ant’s navigational system computes the mathematically
described function.
There is, I think, much to be said in favor of Egan’s analysis of content’s role
in explanations like the above. Here it does seem that content is playing a heuristic
purpose—making the workings easier for the researchers to talk about, and showing
how a specific mathematical formula relates to a cognitive task.
As a general model of content’s role in psychology, however, it is far too limited.
Psychology is not only in the business of explaining how some or other mathematical
function could amount to performing some or other capacity. It tries to predict and
explain behavior more generally. Content ascription is useful for this purpose, even
in the absence of a worked out computational/mathematical model.
Consider again the example from Diesendruck and Peretz (2013), that children’s
categorization behavior is governed by the following rule:
(15) If X is an artifact, and X’s creator intended X to be an F, then, ceteris paribus,
categorize X as an F.
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This implicates a representation with the content artifact. When children are in
a state that predicates being an artifact on some object, their behavior will be as
Diesendruck and Peretz (2013) describe. (Children did not follow an analogous rule
when categorizing non-artifacts like animals.)
Here, content ascription does not seem to play the role of showing how a non-
intentional mechanism amounts to performing a pre-theoretically characterized task.
The characterization of the mechanism itself is intentional—there is no explicit com-
putational model that needs to be interpreted. So, content ascription is not only useful
for “securing the connection” between a computational model and a pre-theoretically
characterized capacity.
I want to press a more general point: Content attribution allows us to exploit our
understanding of P—some property, object, or whatever in the world—to make spe-
cific predictions about the behavior of a system that represents P, without needing to
know any details about how that system works. That is, we can infer from properties
and relations of the thing represented to behavioral effects of the representing states.
This is common practice in folk psychology. Because we know what it means to
be poisonous, for example, we can predict that if Schobert represents the mushrooms
as being poisonous he will not eat them. The fact that he does eat the mushrooms
we take as evidence that he did not represent them as poisonous.
This sort of prediction is also a common practice in scientific psychology. We use
what we know about P to make specific predictions about how a system will behave
if it represents P. Take for example Leslie and Keeble’s (1987) landmark study of
infants’ perception of causal events. They predicted a behavioral difference in how
long six month olds would look at a certain sequence of events based on whether
they represent it as causal rather than as non-causal sequences. The setup worked
like this: One group of infants was habituated to a display where a moving object,
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A, contacted a stationary object, B, which then moved.5 They were then shown the
same display, played in reverse (B moves, hits A, then A moves). The other group of
infants was habituated to a display where A moves, stops short of contacting B, then
B moves. After habituation, they were shown that display in reverse.
Leslie and Keeble (1987) predicted that infants in the first group would dishabit-
uate more strongly to the reversed scenario (i.e., look longer at it) than those in the
second group. Why should this be? After all, just as much has visually changed in
each display. They reasoned as follows: Though they may be identical in appearance,
there is an ontological difference between causal events and non-causal events. Causal
events have distinct roles for the agent of causation and patient of causation. When
you reverse a causal event, there is an additional change in role (B changes from pa-
tient to agent, vice versa for A). Since no such roles exist in non-causal events, then
there are more changes in causal reversal scenarios than in non-causal reversals. So,
Leslie and Keeble (1987) hypothesized that if infants represented the contact scenario
as causation but not the non-contact scenario, they would perceive contact-reversal as
more novel than non-contact reversal. And this is exactly what they found: infants
dishabituated more strongly to the contact-reversal scenario than the non-contact
scenario.
The moral is that researchers were able to make a prediction about behavior based
only on ascribing a particular representational content to infants, and knowing what
that content means. Content’s role here is to license the move from a thing in the
world having certain non-observable properties to a prediction about how mental
representations will affect behavior. The realist thus has an advantage over the anti-
5Looking time studies are based on the idea that infants look longer at things that are novel.
They are first habituated to a stimulus. That is, they are repeatedly shown some target scenario until
they grow bored of seeing it—where they spend no more time looking at the display than anything
else in their environment. Then, they are presented with one of several different test scenarios.
Researchers measure how long they look at the various new scenarios, and compare the degree to
which they dishabituate. The longer they look, the more novel they perceive it.
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realist: they can explain why predictions like Leslie and Keeble’s (1987) work, and
the anti-realist cannot. Unless these ascriptions are picking out some real (objective,
evaluator-independent) feature of the representations, it is difficult to see why the
predictions should succeed. The predicted behavior is intimately connected with the
nature of the content ascribed. And this match does not seem to be in any way
a result of our theoretical goals and aims. Indeed, there was no pre-theoretically
characterized capacity being explained. The researchers made a prediction of what
behavior the infants would exhibit based on the meaning of hypothetical content.
One possible anti-realist reply is that if we knew how the computational mech-
anisms underpinning causal perception worked, we could make the same behavioral
predictions without needing to appeal to content. If we had such a mechanism, the
thought goes, content would be reduced to playing the heuristic role that Egan (2014)
envisions. This is an unsatisfying reply for two reasons. First, it leaves it mysterious
why these sorts of predictions should be so successful in the absence of a worked out
computational model. If infants don’t really represent causation, it’s something of an
accident that ascribing causation representations to them should make the very subtle
and precise predictions that it does. Second, it does not actually matter to Leslie and
Keeble’s (1987) theory how exactly the computational mechanism works. Any system
that represents causation as such is likely to exhibit a sensitivity to agent/patient
reversals because of the nature of causation. So, their prediction could in principle
subsume many different types of computational mechanisms. Infants, adults, camels,
and Martians may all deploy different computational mechanisms, but if they repre-
sent causal events as such, we would predict that they exhibit different sensitivities
to causal and non-causal reversals. And if they do not, that would count as evidence
that they do not.
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5.4 Does realism require a naturalized semantics?
Realists are typically committed to some version of semantic naturalism. They
claim that mental states have determinate content, and that this content is determined
by some naturalistic relation. Millikan (2002) and Neander (2013), for example,
advance theories that claim, roughly, that a representation’s content is determined
by its biological function. Fodor (1992a) and Rupert (1999) offer theories claiming
that having some content, P, is a matter of standing in the right sort of causal
relation to P. Egan (2014) aims to erode support for realism, and thereby motivate
anti-realism as an alternative, by casting doubt on the plausibility of these types
of naturalization projects. If no naturalistic property or relation yields determinate
content, she reasons, then eliminativism or anti-realism are our only options. Since
content is useful and ineliminable, then it looks like we ought to be anti-realists.
Her argument, in broad strokes, is that there are certain general problems about
determinacy facing any naturalized theory of content, and no one has yet proposed
a naturalistic relation that uncontroversially overcomes them, despite being aware
of these problems for decades. So, she reasons, it is unlikely that there is such a
naturalistic relation to be found. This is what Neander (2015) calls an “argument
from despair.”
The determinacy challenges that Egan (2014) has in mind take this general form:
Inevitably, any naturalistic relation that some state, S, bears to some candidate con-
tent P, it will also bear to some other non-Ps. The details depend on the type of
theory. Causal theories of mental content, for example, hold that having the content
P is a matter of being causally connected to P in the right sort of way. But there are
some non-P properties such that P is instantiated iff those things are instantiated
too. This may be accidental—the property of being a fly may be instantiated iff the
property ambient black nuisances is instantiated, if flies are the only ambient black
nuisances that exist. Some properties, however, are necessarily co-instantiated—being
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a fly, being an undetached proper fly part, and being a temporal stage of a fly, to take
Quine’s (1960) examples. The problem, then, is that if S is causally connected to
being a fly, it is inevitably causally connected to these other properties as well, so
it is difficult (to understate it) to see how S can determinately mean fly. (Similar
worries can be raised for teleological theories of content.)
One could respond to the argument from despair by defending a particular natu-
ralistic semantic theory, and demanding that Egan debate it on its particular merits.
Or, one could say that it is too soon to despair, and the fact that we have made some
progress warrants a more hopeful outlook.
Neither response, however, is necessary. Egan’s (2014) argument from despair does
not give us any reason to take the anti-realist stance. Anti-realism, recall, claims that
we need to attribute determinate content to representational states, and that our
theoretical goals determine what this content is. Given her reasons for despair over
finding a naturalized semantics, she cannot justify both claims.
First consider why a theorist would be attributing determinate content. Either
they have a good empirical basis for attributing determinate content, or they do not.
If they do, then it’s not their theoretical goals that determine what content they
need to attribute, but the empirical facts. Consider again Leslie and Keeble’s (1987)
work on infants’ causal perception. Their reasons for ascribing determinate causation
content to infants was that the infants behaved in a way we would expect only if they
represented certain situations as causation. Their attribution was based on objective
facts: how long infants looked at different types of stimuli. So, it seems that facts
about infants’ behavior are best explained by attributing causation content. If we
need content ascription to explain these sorts of facts—objective (evaluator indepen-
dent), empirically based facts—then we have reason to believe that the objective world
instantiates these properties. So, if content attribution is based on facts like these,
119
then the anti-realists’ second claim is unmotivated. The world, not our theoretical
goals, determines what content we ascribe to a representational system.
Egan’s worries about determinacy give us some reason to believe we cannot have
this sort of basis. She claims that there are always alternative candidate contents that
are equally compatible with all of the observable regularities concerning a system. If
the system exhibited some behavioral regularity that privileged, say, a fly attribution
over a temporal fly stage attribution, we would be in the above scenario. But since flies
and temporal fly stages are empirically inseparable (you can’t have one without the
other), it seems we could not find any such regularity. So, if we attribute determinate
fly content to the system, this can only be because we made some choice based on
extra-empirical factors, like “ease of explanation” (Egan’s (2014) example, p. 125).
Now, however, the question is why we need to attribute determinate content. Why
would explanations in psychology need to ascribe content that is determinate beyond
the point of empirical decidability? They might do it purely for convenience—it would
be a pain to list all of the Quinean competitors for some representation’s content. But
this would not justify anti-realism. It would justify a limited form of eliminativism.
Determinate content would be, in principle, eliminable from explanations. It could be
replaced by a (very long) list of competing content. Determinate content ascription
would play no role in psychology beyond providing convenient shorthand for such
a list. (This falls short of full-fledged eliminativism because indeterminate content
would still play some theoretically useful purpose.)
Egan’s (2014) move to say content is required to “secure the connection” between
a mechanism and a pre-theoretically characterized capacity only pushes this problem
back a step. Suppose a capacity is characterized in a way that requires us to dis-
tinguish among these empirically indiscernible competitors. In order to see how a
computational system amounts to, say, the cognitive capacity to visually detect prey,
we may need to describe it as representing flies instead of undetached fly parts. But
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now we want to know what our our basis is for characterizing the capacity in this way.
If it is objective, empirically observable facts about the system, then the determinate
content attribution is not theory driven. The characterization of the capacity is a
product of the world, not our theoretical goals, and the need to attribute determinate
content results from that characterization. If, on the other hand, our characterization
of the capacity is based on some extra-empirical facts, then explaining that capac-
ity, so characterized, is not a theoretically sound goal. This characterization is best
viewed as convenient shorthand for something indeterminate. So, again, a qualified
eliminativism is what is warranted, not anti-realism.
This may be the appropriate analysis of the desert ant’s navigational system. We
have no good reason to think that it represents steps taken instead of, say, distance
walked. And for a computational theory like Wehner and Wehner’s (1990) to work,
we do not need to treat their determinate interpretation as anything more than con-
venient shorthand for a number of empirically indiscernible candidates. Of course, if
we learn more about how the ant works, and we come to have a reason to discriminate
between these alternatives, we would then start taking these attributions as substan-
tive. But it would be the objective facts about the ant, not the theorist’s goals, that
demand determinacy.
The anti-realist is thus presented with a dilemma: For any explanation that at-
tributes determinate content to a system, either there is a good naturalistic basis for
this attribution or there is not. If there is, realism is justified. If not then psychology,
qua empirically driven enterprise, does not need to attribute determinate representa-
tions, and so does not need the anti-realist’s analysis of how content attributions get
their determinacy.
The error in Egan’s (2014) argument was in thinking that realism requires a
naturalistic account of content determination. It does not. What it requires is that
there be a purely naturalistic basis for determinate content attribution. Generally
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speaking, we can know that something has a certain property without knowing how
it managed to get that property. If our reasons for attributing that property are based
on objective, empirically backed facts, and if attributing that property conforms to
good scientific practice—if, for example, it is not ad hoc—then we have reason to
believe that this property exists in the world, independently of our theorizing about
it.
My proposal, then, is simply to treat determinate attributions of content as normal
sorts of empirical hypotheses. Theorists predict that a system will behave a certain
way if it has some or other determinate content, then observe how it behaves, and
confirm that it has this content. These hypotheses are, of course, susceptible to
empirical uncertainty. It is up to psychologists to do the work of figuring out which
content applies by considering and rejecting plausible rival hypotheses.
Realism about mental content is not exceptional in scientific discourse. While it
may be true that some hypotheses—e.g., those featuring Quinean competitors—may
never be evicted, the inability to dismiss empirically indiscernible rival hypotheses is
hardly a problem unique to psychology. The reasons to resist realism here are just
the same reasons to resist scientific realism generally.
If someone could show that it was impossible for representations to get content
in a naturalistically respectable way, then all bets are off. But no one has, of course,
shown any such thing. And the fact that at least some determinate attributions of
content have a good naturalistic basis give us very good reason to doubt that anyone
could.
5.5 Hyper-representationalism
I want to turn now from realism to a stronger view: hyper-representationalism.
“Hyper-representationalism” is Egan’s (2014) name for a collection of three interre-
lated claims, which she states as follows:
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(1) that mental representations have their contents essentially, (2) that
misrepresentation is possible, and (3) that such content is determined by
a privileged naturalistic property or relation. (117-8)
I am not going to argue for (2) and (3). These have been extensively discussed
in the literature.6 Moreover, Egan (2014) does not deny (2) (on her view misrepre-
sentation is possible, but only relative to an explanatory project), and her argument
against (3), as discussed above, is little more than despair.
My focus, then, is on (1), content essentialism. This is a claim about the type
identity of mental representations within cognitive psychology. It says that psychol-
ogy’s explanations range over representations that are characterized in part by their
content, such that representations with distinct content are ipso facto different types
of representations.
Representations, on this view, are something like words in a language. Words
are n-tuples of vehicles (various orthographic and phonetic types) and content. Both
types of elements—vehicle and content—are part of what makes a word the type
of word it is. So, <peculate> and <embezzle> are different words, despite having
identical content.7 And <sink1> (meaning a small artificial basin) and <sink2>
(meaning to become submerged) are distinct words despite sharing a representational
vehicle, ‘sink’. Likewise, hyper-representationalism claims that representations with
different content are ipso facto distinct representational types. A mental symbol with
the content cow, on this view, is a distinct mental representation from one with the
content horse, despite any other similarities between them.
The reasons for being a hyper-representationalist are related to the reasons for
being a realist. Some of the laws and generalizations of cognitive science are couched
in intentional terms. Realists claim that the regularities such laws/generalizations
6See Adams and Aizawa (2010) and Neander (2012) for overviews.
7I am using ‘<>’ to indicate words, as opposed to the orthographic types typically indicated by
single quotes.
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capture only exist at the level of content. Pylyshyn (1984) offers the following exam-
ple: we can predict and explain people’s behavior in light of their believing that they
are in the presence of an emergency. People who believe they are in the presence
of an emergency will try to get help—a generalization that ranges over people who
represent their situation as an emergency and their actions as attempts to get help.
Nothing besides being believed to be an emergency unifies, say, a car crash, a child
being trapped down a well, or a knife wielding person lurking outside the window.
And nothing besides being believed to be an attempt to get help plausibly unifies the
actions of, say, flagging down a police officer, dialing 911 on a cell phone, dialing 911
from a pay phone, shouting ‘help!’, etc. So, this generalization provides a useful way
of saying what otherwise distinct states have in common that explains their partici-
pating in a certain sort of regularity. And, since no other property can stand in for
believing that X is an emergency or believing that Y is an attempt to get help, this
property is ineliminable (Pylyshyn, 1984, p.5–12).
Where realism claims that certain regularities are only expressible in intentional
terms, content essentialism says that those regularities are only expressible in those
intentional terms. If content essentialism is true, then talking about representations
with P content picks out a different class of mental representations than those with
Q (6= P ) content. So, if we have good reason to state a law or generalization in de-
terminate intentional terms, then any law/generalization subsuming representations
under different intentional terms is ipso facto capturing a different regularity because
it subsumes a different set of representations.
Hyper-representationalism claims that cognitive science is committed to an ontol-
ogy of representations typed by content. There are generalizations that hold of all and
only P representers, and different generalizations will hold of Q ( 6= P) representers.
By attributing the determinate content P to a system, you thereby lump it in with
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all the other P representers, and thus become committed to all the laws that are true
of things that represent P as such.
As evidence for this, we would look to see if theorists treat generalizations cast
in terms of different content as different generalizations. This is, I suspect, taken
for granted in folk psychology. The fact that so-and-so believes that there is an
emergency licenses a different swath of predictions about their behavior than, say,
their believing that it looks like there is an emergency, or there is a traffic accident,
or there was a loud noise, or whatever.
The same is true, I contend, of cognitive science proper. We have already seen
suggestive examples from the developmental literature. Leslie and Keeble (1987) make
different predictions about looking time behavior in infants based on the putative
content of their perceptions. Had the content been anything but causation, they
would not have made the same prediction because the predicted behavior was tied up
with facts about causation as such. Causation representers, they reasoned, will obey
certain rules not true of non-causal sequence representers.
Diesendruck and Peretz (2013) explain differences in children’s categorization be-
havior depending on whether the child represents an object as an artifact (versus a
natural kind). It would be a difference in theoretical substance to explain their be-
havior in terms of their representing objects as, say, human-made items. Possibly not
all artifacts are human-made items, so we can imagine something that responds selec-
tively to only the latter. By saying that infants represent objects as artifacts we are
grouping them with artifact representers, and not human-made items representers.
This is not conclusive evidence by any means. I offer only prima facie evidence for
content essentialism: Psychologists use content attribution to buy into certain general
predictions based on the properties of what is being represented. They implicitly
assume that there are laws/generalizations that apply to P representers as such.
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5.6 Egan’s anti-essentialist argument
I want to turn now to Egan’s (2014) argument against content essentialism. Her
argument goes like this: Mental representations are states of computationally charac-
terized devices. Theorists may assign different content to states of computationally
characterized devices, depending on things like its normal environment, how it is em-
bedded in an organism, and various pragmatic considerations. That is, were these
factors to change, the device would retain its identity qua computational device, yet
its content would be different. So, states of computationally characterized devices
do not have their content essentially. So, mental representations do not have their
content essentially.
Because Egan’s (2014) argument is brief, I want to quote it at length:
The structures posited by the computational theory, what we are call-
ing the ‘representational vehicles’, do not have their cognitive contents
essentially. If the mechanism characterized in mathematical terms by the
theory were embedded differently in the organism, perhaps allowing it to
sub-serve a different cognitive capacity, then the structures would be as-
signed different cognitive contents. If the subject’s normal environment
were different (as, for example, in an Ames room), so that the use of these
structures by the device in this environment did not facilitate the execu-
tion of the specified cognitive task, then the structures might be assigned
no cognitive contents at all. (127, emphasis original)
One thing to note is the slide to representational vehicles. Hyper-representationalism,
as Egan herself characterizes it, says that mental representations, not representational
vehicles, have their content essentially. If psychology treats representations as n-tuples
of vehicles and content, then showing that types of vehicles can realize different types
of content is no mark against the view. To equivocate between representation and
vehicle begs the question.
I take it, however, that her point is this: from the perspective of computational
cognitive science, there is no difference between, say, edge and shadow representa-
tions if they are realized by the same type of computational state. Every behavioral
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regularity that holds of one type holds of the “other” type since the computational
features, not the content, govern the behavior of a device.
Egan (2014) has not, however, shown that states of the same type of device—
in the sense that interests psychologists—can be attributed different interpretations.
We might think that psychology is interested in devices that are partly character-
ized by factors like how they are embedded in an organism, and what their normal
environment is. Suppose we have reason to attribute edge to human infants’ visual
systems. The fact that a Martian cat uses the same computational process to audibly
detect fog horns would not itself give us any reason to hedge our original attribution.
Unless human infants happen to be sensitive to fog horns in the same way, we can’t
make any useful predictions about their behavior in those terms. And, if that were
the case, we would want to distinguish humans’ visual representations from Martian
cats’ auditory ones, meaning that these factors are relevant to how we characterize
representations after all.
For Egan’s examples to tell against content essentialism, she would need evidence
that there are devices sharing these sorts of features—being embedded in a certain
sort of organism in a certain sort of way, e.g.—that are attributed different contents
in different explanatory contexts. And she has not offered any.
If you want to know what properties are essential to some higher-level type, you
need to look at what sorts of property changes or differences would cause something
of that type to be categorized differently. If you want to know what properties are es-
sential to being a cow within zoology, figure out what you would have to change about
a cow to make zoologists call it something else (give it different parents? different
genes?).
What Egan is doing instead is showing that the realizers of a higher level type can
also realize other types of things. But the fact that B realizes P in one context, and
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Q in another does not mean that P and Q are not real, or not genuine explanatory
categories.
In neurochemistry, for example, the organic chemical acetylcholine is used as a
neuromodulator in the brain—altering the way brain structures process information.
At neuromuscular junctions, where nerves meet muscles, acetylcholine is used as a
neurotransmitter. Neuromodulators and neurotransmitters are distinct higher level
types. Different generalizations and laws subsume them. So, a law about how neu-
romodulators work would subsume some, but not all instances of acetylcholine. The
fact that the exact same chemical can realize one type when it is embedded one way
in an organism and the other when it is embedded in a different way does not tell
against the reality of those types. They earn their keep by being explanatorily useful
and irreducible to other types. And whatever properties are individuative of them as
a type, they have essentially, by definition.
The same can be said for the relationship between mental representations and
computational/mathematical mechanisms. Being a mental representation is a higher
level property. If it is useful to type mental representations by the content they have,
and we subsume representations (or representing systems) under different generaliza-
tions based on differences in content, then the fact that the same type of computa-
tional/mathematical mechanism can realize different contents is irrelevant to thinking
about how the mental representations they realize should be individuated.
A useful distinction here is between what Shoemaker (1981, 2007) calls core real-
izers and total realizers, which he draws as follows:
A total realizer of a property will be a property whose instantiation is
sufficient for the instantiation of that property. A core realizer will be a
property whose instantiation is a salient part of a total instantiation of it.
(2007, 21)
Being acetylcholine is not a total realizer of being a neuromodulator or of being a
neurotransmitter. The fact that these are different types of properties, and that
128
acetylcholine can be used as either, is evidence of this. It is, however, a core realizer
of each. Being acetylcholine, together with certain other properties (e.g., being used
at a neuromuscular junction) realize the property being a neurotransmitter.
What Egan (2014) has in effect shown is that being a certain type of computational
mechanism is a core realizer, but not a total realizer of being a mental representation
of a certain type. It is part of a total realizer that may include properties like being
embedded in this organism like so and being related to the environment like such.
This is a point that hyper-representationalism can readily take on board. If rep-
resentational types are n-tuples of vehicles and contents, and content is partly deter-
mined by things like how a representation is related to the environment, then knowing
only that a representation is realized by some particular mathematical/computational
mechanism won’t tell us what type of representation it is. So, lacking this informa-
tion, we will only know the computational/mathematical generalizations, missing the
intentional generalizations. The reason we type representations by content, as I ar-
gued above, is to buy into these generalizations. So, on the hyper-representationalist
view, being a certain type of mechanism is not sufficient for realizing the property
of being a certain type of representation. So, showing that the same mechanism can
realize different contents does not show us that mental representations do not have
their content essentially.
Conclusion
In reading the literature on content realism, one can’t help but come away with
the impression that to theorists of a certain mindset, mental content is like under-
wear: useful, but not something to talk about in good company. My hope is that
this chapter goes some way towards fixing content’s image problem. There is nothing
metaphysically disreputable about attributing determinate content to mental states
when the evidence warrants it, and there is no need to explain away its appearance. In
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defending realism and essentialism, I am trying to suggest nothing more than taking
cognitive psychology seriously as a science. It offers empirically driven explanations
of objective features of the world. So, its explanatory vocabulary, if useful and inelim-
inable for predictions and explanations, should also be seen as picking out objective
features of the world.
There is, however, still reason to be cautious. I have suggested that we should
take determinate content attribution seriously if, and only if, there is good empirical
reason for doing so. That is not a trivial matter. Figuring out how to test hypotheses
that offer competing content attributions requires serious empirical work. But neither
is this impossible. When there are differences between two competing contents, it may
be possible to find ways of testing sensitivity to these differences, providing evidence
about what is represented. Saying what content a representation represents is thus a
matter for empirical psychology. Saying how this could possibly be so is still a matter
for philosophy, but not one that needs to be resolved before psychology can go about
its business.
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